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The Navy Industrial Fund is a revolving fund used to
provide working capital for industrial and commercial-type
activities in the Department cf the Navy. At the present
time there are 49 NIF activities with a combined annual
revenue projected to te $14.5 billion for FY 1985.
The authors researched the background of the NIF and its
management, focusing on the organizational structure and
policies affecting the Navy Industrial Fund's cash position.
The purpose of this thesis is to identify cash management
opportunities for the NIF.
Nuiierous opport unites, not presently included in
existing Federal cash management programs, were observed
which would enable the NIF to tetter manage its cash. Eight
specific opportunities are identified, explored and recom-
meniaticns provided tc improve the NIF*s cash position.
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I- lEHQDOCTION
Until fairly recently the topic of cash management
within the public sector was a subject of interest only tc a
few individuals
—
primarily, those involved with cash matters
on a daily basis. However, beginning in the late 1970* s a
distinct change in the attitudes of all Federal managers has
transpired. In the past seven years or so. Federal cash
management has become widely recognized as an essential
element in the effective management of government.
^**hat has generated this recent involvement? Early en in
this period soaring interest rates, at one point over twenty
percent, made money much more "expensive" than any prior
period in history. More recently with interest rates lower
and more stable, and inflation slowing. Federal managers
have been preoccupied dealing with government-wide cash
flows exceeding a trillion dollars annually in FY 1985, a
public debt of S180.4 billion and the interest financing
this debt amounting to an estimated $116.1 billion for FY
1985 [Ref. 1]. With dollar figures like these facing
government managers and the potential for savings inherent
in cash flows of this magnitude, it is little wonder that
cash management has become a lively issue.
What actually is effective cash management, its real
objective, and what have this country's lawmakers and
administrators done to underscore its importance? First,
the specific objective of effective cash management is
simply tc optimize the time-value of money. Federal and
private funds alike. The payoff from deriving the maximum
benefit from cash resources within the public sector results
in an increased availability of funds to the Department of
the Treasury. This directly impacts the amount of Federal
10
torrowing to finance deficits or liquidity shortages and
provides for increased earnings from the investment of
temporarily excess furds. Charged with the primary respon-
sibility for the overall cash management posture of the
Federal Goverment, Treasury has promulgated extensive
guidance on the subject. In particular. Treasury's Circular
1084, issued in December 1976, provided comprehensive policy
guidance. Chapter 8000, entitled "Cash Management", of Part
6, Volume I of the Treasury Fiscal Requi rements Manual was
released in March 1S78 and provided the detailed fiscal
instructions for implementing Circular 1084«s provisions.
When President Reagan came to Washington, he promised
the American people a more responsive, more economical, more
efficient, and less wasteful form of government £Eef. 2J-
Numerous laws under his administration have continued the
trend in emphasizing the efficient handling of money. These
laws include: The Prompt Payment Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-177),
The Eebt Collection Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-365) and The
Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (P.L.
97-255). Specific Office of Management and Budget (0MB)
guidance addressing the cash management issue is contained
in 0MB Circulars A-123, "Internal Control Systems"; A- 125,
"Prompt Payment" and more recently, 0MB Bulletins 83-06,
"Cash Management" and 83-11, "Debt Collection". Federal
agencies have taken this guidance and promulgated tailored
guidance for their individual needs. For example, the
Department of the Navy's (DON) general fiscal policy
guidance is contained in the Navy Comptroller ' s ( NAVCOMPT)
Manual while cash-specific initiatives are consolidated in a
DON Cash Management Action Plan (CASHMAP)
.
The fundamental cornerstones of cash management are
billings, collections, deposits and disbursements.
Performing each of these in a timely and efficient manner so
that funds can be put to work or remain working to
11
Treasury's advantage is the common thread for effective cash
management throughout the public sector. This thesis ¥ill
review one aspect of the Department of the Navy's financial
operations, the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) , in terms of that
fund's cash management posture. Selection of this partic-
ular financial entity was prompted based upon the magnitude
and significance of its fiscal transactions. In total
revenue (314.04 billion) [Ref. 3] it would have ranked
twenty-first behind International Telephone and Telegraph in
1984 [Ref. 4]. The objective of this thesis is to identify
cash management opportunities for the NIF. In addition to
reviewirg and assessing the fund's effectiveness in
achieving the above noted cash management fundamentals, this
thesis examines the NIF, exploring unique opportunities to
enhance cash management.
12
II. THE MIlVY IMD OSTHIAL rOHD CONCEPT AND BACKGRODND
This chapter discusses the theory and principles behind
The Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) / including its legal and regu-
latory background, and changes in the fund's methods of
operation since its irception in 1949.
A. THE IIP COICEPT
Industrial Funds in the Department of Defense (DOD) were
authorized by Title IV of the National Security Act
Ammendments of 1949. The first industrially-funded activity
in the Department of the Navy was the Defense Printing
Service which was converted to NIF operations on November 1,
1949. At the present time there are 49 NIF activities.
(See Table I)
The creation of industrial funds in DOD can be directly
attributed to this country's experiences during World War II
and the nation's climate immediately following the hostili-
ties. Total mobilization of our industrial base had, of
course, been necessary for the successful war effort. This
commitment clearly resulted in the total dedication of our
industrial capacity and the unrestrained consumption of the
nation's natural resources. However, with the war's cessa-
tion came demands throughout the country for the consumer
goods foregone on behalf of the conflict. National emphasis
shifted towards cutting what had become extravagant military
expenditures. Economy and efficiency became the watch words
of the times. During the Senate Armed Services Committee
hearings incident to the 1949 Ammendments it was stated that
studies made prior to 1949 of industrial and commercial
activities of the military departments had shown a lack of
13
TABLE I
HaYj Industrial Fund Activities as of 1 January 1985
ACTIVITIES NUMBEfi
Shipyards 8
Aircraft Rework Facilities 6
Ordnance Activities 10




Data Automation Ccmmand 1
Avionics Center 1
Air Engineering Center 1
49
Source: U.S. Department of
Comptroller
the Navy, Off ice of the
adequate cost accounting in such activities and had indi-
cated the need for scne means of accurate, yet simple, cost
determination. While appropriation accounting appeared
satisfactory for purely administrative or military-type
functions, it was not felt to be adequate or desirable for
industrial and commercial type activities. Rather it was
14
believed that govertnent could successfully benefit from
adopting scientific management techniques, and the
accounting and budgeting techniques employed by American
business enterprises for years.
Under the then existing Federal budget and appropriation
structure, projects or programs undertaken by military
activities required financing from several individual appro-
priations. Generally, the appropriations were controlled
and accounted for by organizational divisions which were not
only widely scattered geographically tut were also unre-
lated, except with regard to administrative purposes. This
was felt to be both uneconomical and inefficient. The
concept of the industrial fund as a funding medium was
developed. By design, such a fund, once established by
Congress and provided with an initial cash allccaticn,
called a "corpus", would become self-sustaining. The fund
would finance one complete cycle of operations by a member
activity. The cash available in the corpus would be used
initially to fund the costs of producing goods or services
ordered by "customers". A customer could be: a Systems
Command, or any department thereof, an Operating Force
Command, other governmental elements, or selected private
sector parties. The proceeds from the sale of these goods
or services through reimbursement by the customer would be
deposited back into the industrial fund account to finance
subsequent activity. Thus, the creation of the irdustrial
fund wculd eliminate the need for several appropriations to
finance the daily operation of an activity. [Eef- 5]
The authors note that the word "fund" has a special
technical meaning in government accounting:
A fund is defined as an independent fiscal and
accounting entity with a self-balancing set of accounts
recording cash and/cr other resources together with all
related liabilities, obligations, reserves, and equities
which are segregated for the purpose of carrying on
specific activities or attaining certain objectives in
15
accordance with special regulations, restrictions, or
limitations- [Ref. 6]
Tliis definition highlights the meaning of the word "fund" as
a separate accounting entity, created by law and governed by
specific regulations.
The Navy Industrial Fund, the largest of five estab-
lished DOD Industrial Funds, is a "revolving or working
capital fund" £Bef. 7]. Table II provides the production
costs of each of DOD's Industrial funds for FY »s 1984-1986
and clearly highlights the NIF's eminence.
TABLE II
DOD Industrial Funds Prodaction Costs
($ in thousands)
Industrial Fund J984 1985 (est) 1986 (est)
Amy 3,321,165 3,364,894 2,804,500
Navy 13,596,885 14,835,316 14,634,500
Marine Corps 90,611 92,190 85,400
Air Icrce 6,876,777 6,872,989 6,737,500
Defense 1,022,436 1,117,342 1,214,800
Source: The Budget Of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1986
It is utilized to provide the working capital (cash and
capitalized fixed assets) necessary to finance the opera-
tions of selected Navy industrial and commercial-type activ-
ities. The Navy considers industrial activities to be:
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Those activities engaged in production or construction,
modification, conversion. alteration, renovation, or
rehabilitation. overhaul and maintenance of ships,
aircraft, guided missiles, other weapons, ammunition,
vehicles, and equipment of all kinds, and other military
operating supplies, including components and spare parts
ox such items. [Bef. 8]
Commercial-type activities are defined to be:
Those activities that perform or provide such services
as transportation and port terminal services, base
services, printing, research. development, and evalua-
tion, engineering and logistics support, and automated
data processing services. £Bef. 8]
In theory, an industrial or commercial activity financed
by a working capital fund and using standard, accepted, and
proven commercial practices of cost accounting should lead
to greater efficiency, economy and accountability. As such,
the management of each activity would:
1. Become directly responsible for accounting for funds
and the costing of the operations.
2. Be encouraged to reduce operating costs.
3. Have the opportunity to compare costs and develop a
spirit of cost competition with activities of a
similar nature. [Ref. 5]
B. LEGAL BACKGEOOND
The establishment of working capital funds in the
Department of Defense was authorized by Public Law 216,
Eighty-First Congress, Section 405 (The National Security
Act AmmeEdments of 19U9) [Bef. 9]- The section covering
working capital funds (Section U05) has been incorporated
into the United States Code as 10 USC 2208, Working Capital
Funds. Paragraph 2208 provides the broad general guidelines
for the establishment and operation of working capital
funds. Particular sections of paragraph 2208 are worthy of
17
note. Section 2208(a) of Title 10, USC, allows the
Secretary of Defense to establish such funds in the
Department of Defense to:
1. Finance inventories of such supplies as he may desig-
nate; and
2 Provide workinq capital for such industrial type
activities that provide common services within or
among departments or agencies of the Department of
Defense as he may designate.
Section 2208(f) prohibits customers of working capital funds
from buying goods or services for which the customer does
not have specific funds or appropriations available.
Section 2208 (i) re^iuires that annual reports shall be made
to the President and to the Congress on the condition and
operation of working capital funds established under this
particular section. Further, it is provided in 10 USC
2208 (h) that the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regu-
lations governing the operation of activities and use of
inventories authorized by this particular section.
[Ref. 10]
C. BEGDLATOEY BACKGBCUHD
Ihe detailed guidance concerning industrial funds is
contained in Departmect of Defense Directive 7410.4, enti-
tled "Regulations Governing Industrial Fund Operations."
COD Directive 7410-4 provides regulations governing each of
the five established working capital funds, known as (1) the
Defense Industrial Fund, (2) the Army Industrial Fund, (3)
the Navy Industrial Fund, (4) the Marine Corps Industrial
Fund and (5) the Air force Industrial Fund.
Each industrial fund consists of the undisbursed balance
with the Treasury, accounts receivable, inventories of
of iiaterials, supplies, work in process, and all ether
as5 ts pertaining to or acquired in the operations of
the activities financed under the fund subject to all
liabilities incurred in connection with such operations,
[Ref. 11]
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Part V.A of DOD Directive 7U10.4 states that industrial
funds are designed to:
1. Provide a more effective means for controlling the
costs of goods and services reiiuired to te ^rcaaced
or furnished by industrial and commercial type activ-
ities, and a more effective and flexible means for
financing, budgeting and accounting for the costs
thereof;
2. Create and recognize contractual relationships
between industrial and commercial type activities and
those activities which budget for and order the end
product or services, in order to provide management
advantages and incentives for efficiency and economy;
3. Provide to managers of industrial and commercial
activities the financial authority and flexibility
required to procure and use manpower, materials ana
other resources effectively;
4. Encourage more cross-servicing among the military
departments atd among their operating agencies, with
the aim of obtaining more economical use of
facilities;
5. Support the performance budgeting concept by facili-
tating budgeting and repoting for the costs of end
products, and thus underlining the cost consequences
of decision making, including choices between alter-
natives in such terms.
Part V.B further lists 12 specific objectives:
1. To furnish managers of industrial and commercial type
activites with management tools comparable to those
utilized by efficient private enterprises engaged in
similar types of activities;
2. To provide an incentive for managers of industrial
fund activities to improve cost estimating and cost
control though the use of cost standards by requiring
a contractual relationship between producer ana
ordering agencies;
3. Require alert, forward looking financial planning at
industrial and commercial activities by making them
dependent financially on reimbursements received for
goods and services furnished in fulfilling orders
from customers;
U. Impel producers of goods and services to coordinate
labor forces and inventories with workload generated.
It is recognized that statutory and executive
restrictions en the level of employment and the addi-
tions or reductions of personnel frequently limit
flexibility a cd make difficult effective control over
employment in relation to workload. However,
prodacers must avoid the tendency to maintain a labor
force without regard to workload levels, taking into
consideration the balancing of skills to meet the
anticipated workload;
5. To coordinate the financial aspects of detailed esti-
mation and planning for job performance in terirs of
material requirements ana labor operations.
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production scheduling and control, and procurement
and inventory control, with budgeting and cost
control;
6. To establish and use realistic cost standards as
targets rather than detailed cost limitations;
7. Require ordering agencies to budget, control and
account for the cost of all goods and services
ordered rather than allow them to obtain goods and
services free. Conversely at the industrial fund
activity the objective shall be pursued of reducing
the amount of goods and services not paid for from
the industrial fund. Taken together these two state-
ments establish the objective that the industrial
funded activity will neither furnish nor receive
"free" goods and services, nor will the activity
enter into arrangements to "offset" services received
and services furnished. This requirement is designed
to instill in the officials of these agencies a
greater sense cf responsibility and self restraint in
limiting their orders, and balancing the costs of
specific goods and services to be ordered against the
benefits and advantages of their procurement, espe-
cially in light of alternative or competing demands;
8. To place ordering agencies in the position of critic
of purchase prices (i.e.- costs of performing activi-
ties) as well as gualiry and delivery speed of the
?oods and services ordered in consideration of rela-
ive costs of similar performing activities and
outside agencies;
9. Provide meaningful bills to ordering agencies,
clearly relating the goods and services lurnishGd by
a performing activity to the charges rendered,
causing the ordering agencies to assess their
procurement practices and specifications in full
awareness of the costs involved;
10. Enable ordering agencies to budget and account on an
^•end-product" basis (the same as when buying from
commercial contractors) , simplifying budget presenta-
tions, budgeting control, and accounting procedures
for both producers and ordering agencies;
11. To establish, wherever feasible, predetermined prices
(tariff schedules, price lists, fixed price orders)
ror goods and services furnished by industrial fund
activities, thus setting standard prices on perform-
ance and enabling ordering agencies to plar and
budget more ccrfidently;
12. To encourage management of. ordering agencies to
improve prograa planning and scheduling, in response
to producers efforts to negotiate for orders as far
in advance as possible.
LOD Directive 7 410.4 further specifies that customers cf an
industrial activity may be:
1. Operating force commands, or mission units thereof,
operation agencies, commodity commands, inventory
control points- weapons system or project managers,
or any Department of Defense components having
missions and reponsibilities separate from management
and operation cf the industrial fund activity;
20
2. Military personnel, private individuals and concerns,
and other government agencies as authorized.
[Eef. 11]
The directive also clearly states that the management of
each industrial fund activity shall be held accountable for
the control of cost performance in line with customers'
orders or approved price schedules. A management agency or
command, defined in the Navi Comptroller's Manual as an
"administering office", shall be designated responsible for
effective management of each industrial fund activity.
Table III lists the management agencies and the industrial
activities for which each agency is responsible. £Bef- 12]
The directive requires that reimbursement for the cost
of work and service will normally be made on a progress
payment basis. It specifies that billings and collections
for progress payments will be accomplished at least monthly.
For the non-Department of Defense customers (who repre-
sent less than 0.5 percent of the customer order dollars in
the 1986 budget [Ref. 13], the directive requires that tfcey
shall be charged at prices or rates determined to secure
reimbursement for total costs, including unfunded costs, or
the fair market value of the product or service, whichever
is higher. [Sef. 11] Examples of goods and services
provided to non-Department of Defense customers are:
1. The utilities and building rental fee of a civilian
bank branch located on a Navy base;
2. Utilities provided to a civilian contractor
performing work on a Navy base;
3. The use of equipment belonging to a Public Works
Center by a contract or working on a Navy base.
r. RECEHT DEVELOPMEHTS IN NIP OPERATIONS
With the exception of two significant policy changes,
one in 1S76 and a seccnd in 1983, the Navy Industrial Fund
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Center, Pearl Harbor, HI
Center, Guam, M.I.
Center, Subic Bay, Luzon,
Center, San Diego, CA
Center, Pensacola, FL
Center, Great lakes, IL
Center, San Francisco, CA
NAVFAC
R.O.P.
Engineering laboratory. Naval Construction
Center, ~ ' "Port Hueneme, CA
Military Sealift Command MSC
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Table III
NIF ACTIVITIES AND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES (cont'd)
Naval Ship Research and Development Center, CNM
Washington, DC
Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory, Panama City, FL
Naval Weapons Center. China Lake, CA
Naval Air Development Center, Jonnsville,
Warminister, PA
Naval Underseas Research and Development Center,
San Diego, CA
Naval Electronics laboratory Center, San Diego, CA
Naval Surface Weapons Center. Silver Sprinqs, MD
Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, EI
Navy Regional Data Automation Centers NAVEAC
1
. Rate Stabilization
Prior to 19'/6, NIF activities were permitted to
adjust the rates charged their customers on a quarterly
basis to account for cost increases. Since the customer had
to budget for this work as much as two years in advance of
it actually being performed, cost increases by NIF activi-
ties simply translated into program reductions or requests
to Congress for additional funds. Given that the latter
alternative was less palatable than the first, customers
routinely were forced to cut or delay planned programs.
Rate stabilization was implemented at all NIF activ-
ities during Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977 as a modified method
of charging customers total cost. Dnder this revised method
the NIF activity establishes a customer price or "rate" two
years in advance of when the service will be performed or
the goods delivered. This concept enables the customer to
plan en firm prices for the work to be accomplished as
customer budgets are constructed and defended.
23
NIF activities initially absorb the difference
between the cost of the product or service and the price
charged to the customer. These gains or losses are accumu-
lated and subsequently charged to customers in the next
budget cycle by adjusting the stabilized rate to be charged
in that upcoming budget year, two years in the future.
Stabilized rates are a policy statement to Congress and a
tool by which the budget is made to work. Rate stabiliza-
tion will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII.
2- Fixed Asset Capitalization
At the end of F5f 1981, NAVCOMPT directed all NIF
activities to capitalize into the NIf the estimated bcok
value of all plant property, equipment or other fixed
assets. Procedural guidance was provided in NAVCOMPT
Instruction 7600.27, Capital Investment Program for
Industrial Fund Activities which has since been incorporated
into the NAVCOMPT Manual , Vol 5. Prior to this acticn all
NIF's fixed assets had teen financed directly by
headquarters-level and customer procurement appropriations
and "leaned" or contributed to the NIF for use without
charge. The NIF had operated under the assumption that if
the fundus accumulated financial operating results
approached zero, given NIF's no- profit objective, its cash
balance, being equal to its corpus, was acceptable.
NAVCOMPT* s action set the stage for inclusion of
custoier-funded depreciation in the FY 1982»s stabilized
rates and the authorization for the NIF to begin procurement
of its "own" assets ccmaencing in FY 1983. Coincident with
NAVCCMPT's policy change in regards to depreciation was the
establishment of a several new ledger accounts. One such
equity account, entitled "Assets Capitalized, Contributed
Fixed Assets^ was created as a means to maintain the asset
and equity accounts in balance. A direct result of
24
accountirg for this depreciation expense was an increase in
the applied charge to the customer in the form of higher
stabilized rates. Another new account created entitled
"Equity Eeserves" provided the NIF a means to reduce and
tetter control its cash account rather than transfer all of
its revenue into Accumulated Operating Results (AOH) from
which it is distributed back to the customers. This account
is used as an accounting tool to earmark cash to (1) procure
new capital equipment, (2) develop management information
systems and (3) accoicplish miner construction projects.
E. PBE7IO0S EFFORTS 10 IHPBO?E CASH ilANAGEflEHT
The search for opportunities to improve cash management
has been underway in the Federal Government since the
1970's. This effort has resulted in the identification of
several specific areas which could improve the cash position
at the Treasury Department, and appropriate action has been
taken to implement these ideas. Primarily, the studies and
actions to date have focused upon optimizing the timing of
operations such as tilling, collecting, depositing, and
disbursicg cash. iihile these actions obviously apply to
operations at the NIF, to date no study has been completed
with the specific goal of improving NIF cash management.
In the process of researching this topic, the authors
reviewed numerous theses on the subject of the Navy
Industrial Fund held at the Naval Postgraduate School.
These studies included a general overview of the NIF organi-
zation, a description of the NIF operation, and an
explanation of the workings of stabilized rates, but did not
specifically address NIF cash management.
Additionally, the authors referred to several Naval
Audit Service reports on various NIF financial operations.
These audits reviewed NIF adherence to existing regulations
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and did not attempt tc identify any new areas for improving
cash management.
Finally, during the course of background research, the
authors were informed that a private sector study, commis-
sioned by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, was
underway with the purpose of reviewing the entire NIF opera-
tion. This study will not be completed for some time and
thus the findings will not be available prior to the comple-
tion of this thesis.
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III. THE MIF CASH MANAGEMENT CHAILEHGE
The efforts toward optimizing the use of the Federal
Government's cash have resulted in a series of legislative
acts, regulations, policy memoranda, and other documents
which address the subject of cash management. The objective
of these actions is to minimize the cash held outside cf the
cash account of the treasury, and thereby unavailable for
use and to accelerate amounts due the Federal Government,
For most agencies, this objective translates as a policy to
optimize the timing cf the flow of cash in the areas of
billings, collections, disbursements, and deposits. For the
Navy Industrial Fund, operating as a revolving fund, this
objective offers the added challenge to develop programs
which optimize cash position as well as cash flo w.
The interest in cash management was not always shared by
all parts of the Federal Government. It began in the 1970*s
at the Treasury Department, which has historically main-
tained a close watch en government-wide cash balances, and
slowly spread to other departments and agencies. In 1S71
the Division of Banking and Cash Management was created at
the Treasury in order to manage government money more effec-
tively and provide cash management guidelines for other
agencies to follow. Another major milestone occurred in FY
1978 with the issuance of a Presidential memorandum which
required follow-on cash management internal reviews by
Federal agencies.
The current list of directives on the subject of cash
management is extensive. Table IV provides a listing of
those items which lost influence NIF operations. The
Federal cash management position is stated in Treasury
Circular 1084 of December 1976 and specific regulations for
billings, collections, deposits, and disbursements are
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TABLE lY
Federal Cash Management Documents
Legislative Acts:
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950
Leht Collection Act of 1982
Prompt Payment Act of 1982
Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982
Federal Claims Collection Act
Treasury Department Financial Manual, Volume I:
Part 2, "Central Accounting and Reporting"
Part t^ , "Disbursing Regulations"
Part 5, "Deposit Regulations"
Part S, Chapter 2000, "Cash Advances Onder
Federal Grant and Other Programs"
Part 6, Chapter 8000, "Cash Management"
Treasury Department Circulars:
176, "Depositories and Fiscal Agents"
830, "Disbursing Officers"
945, "Central Accounting for Revenues and Outlays
and Related Assets and Liabilities"
965, "Reporting Year-End Status And Closing of
Appropriation and Fund Accounts"
1075, "Cash Advances"
1076, "Payments to Financial Organizations"
1083, "Use of TFCS"
1084, "Cash Management"
Treasury Department Bulletins:
82-10, "Agency Deposit Transactions"
E2-18, "Report on Status of Accounts/Loans
Receivable Due From the Public"
32-22, "Deposits-In-Transit"
83-14, "TFCS Payments"
Office of Managemect and Budget Financial
Management and Accounting Guidelines
Office of Management and Budget Circulars:
A-0 11, "Annual Budget Estimates; Preparation of"
A-034, "Budget Execution"
A-112, "Monitoring Federal Outlays"
A-123, "Internal Control Systems"
A-125, "Prompt Payment"




General Accounting Office/Department of Justice
"Federal ClaiEs Collection Standards"
General Accounting Office Policy and Procedures Manual
NAVCOMPT Manual
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detailed in the Treasur y Fiscal Ee^^uirements Manual, Vclume
I, Part 6, Chapter 8000, issued in March 1978. Each Federal
agency is required to follow these guidelines so as to
maximize the amount of cash available to the Treasury
Department and thus freclude unnecessary borrowing. The
Department of the Navy applies these regulations as part of
its Cash Management Action Plan (CASHMAP) . This plan
includes milestones for bringing Navy disbursement and
collecticn programs into conformance with Federal require-
ment s, attempts to consolidate Navy cash management poli-
cies, and sets a goal for increased use of electronic funds
transfer (EFT) acd locked boxes.
The present focus of Federal cash management initiatives
is on billing, collecting, depositing, and disbursing funds
in a timely manner. Certainly, the efficient flew of cash
is a sound cash management practice and allows cash to work
better either by earning interest or repaying (short term)
debt and thus eliminating or reducing interest payments.
In addition to optimizing the flow of cash, certain
organizations in the Federal Government have the opportunity
for enhanced cash management through other actions which are
unique to their type of business. For example, actions
which reduce the costs of conducting business (i.e. overhead
costs) certainly save the Treasury Department money by
reducing the amount the government borrows. Any reduction
in the level of cash held outside the Treasury and at a
particular activity (i.e. inventory) also improves the
Treasury Department's cash position. For the activity
groups of the Navy Industrial Fund the ability to maintain a
proper level of cash and to forecast a future cash position
have proven to be significant challenges. Table V and
Figure 3.2 show the wildly fluctuating Treasury cash posi-
tions of the three largest NIF activity groups, as well as








FY END SHIPYDS NAEF'S MSC NIF TOTAL
' ' 1975 21.1 8.0 74.7 106.4
1976 52.4 6.4 130.4 385-5
197T UO.O -2.2 156.8 387.5
1977 68.0 -4.1 108.9 315.3
1978 116.3 64.1 34.9 378.2
1979 66.0 8.3 44.6 307.3
1980 92.8 23.1 124.8 461.1
1981 128.3 21.4 78.2 386.5
1982 116.6 -42.6 101.8 345.3
1983 50.4 -197.2 356.9 130.5
1981* 27.2 -247.0 716.2 807.9
These cash account balances represent the amount of NIF
cash presently at th€ Treasury. By law (Title 31, D.S.
Code, Sections 1341 and 1517) this amount is not allowed to
te overdrawn (become negative) for the NIF as a whole, and
theoretically should average at a level equal to the dollar
amount of the corpus. Figure 3.1 depicts the total NIF cash
position in relation to the corpus for fiscal years 1975
through 1984. Activity Groups are presently not required by
law to maintain non-negative Treasury cash positiors, tut
their positions do directly effect the total NIF cash posi-
tion. Of greatest significance today is the negative cash
positioE of the Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARF*s) and the
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Ihe perturbations in the cash positions of the NIF
activity groups have the potential to impact upon the
solvency of the NIF. Compounding this problem is the diffi-
culty experienced in projecting these fluctuations.
Treasury cash account balance predictions, made ty indi-
vidual activities during the budget process and referred to
as "planced cash", experience a very high degree of vari-
ability. This variatility, the difference between planned
and actual cash expressed as a percentage of planned cash,
is referred to as "cash variance". Table 71 depicts the FY
1984 year-end cash variances for several major NIF activity
groups.
TABLE YI
Treasury Cash Variances for Selected NIF Activity
Groups
($ in millions)
ACTIVITY 30 SEP 1984 30 SEP 1984 VARIANCE
GROUP PLANNED ACTUAL (PERCENT)
SEIPiARDS -143.3 27.2 119.0
NARFs -289.3 -246.9 14.7
MSC 646.5 716.2 10.8
TT:TII~11I7 "511371 ""8D77^ ~H'5~1
As shown, the cash variance for the Naval Shipyards was
119 percent for fiscal year 1984 while the entire NIF
experienced a cash variance of almost 50 percent. These
high variances are significant since they reflect an
inability of the NIF activities to achieve a cash position
previously forecast.
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The inability to accurately forecast cash positions is
undesiraile for several reasons. First, it has the poten-
tial to impact upon the level of funding an activity
receives. For example, an organization which routinely
experiences high cash variances may require a higher level
of working capital in order to cover the range of these
variances. Second, if high variances become the norm, then
actions taken which may have not optimized the use of cash
may te masked within this variance and remain undiscovered.
Finally, activities may make unwise management decisions in
an effort to reduce this variance while the real problem
could be poor forecasting. Table VII shows cash variances
for the Naval Shipyards and NARFs which were based upon
revised projections made at the start of the fourth guarter
of FY 1984.
TABLE VII








SHIPYARDS -83.2 27.2 132.7
NARFs -305.3 -246.9 19.1
As seen in Table VII, even shortening the time horizon
did not correct the problem of these high cash variances.
In fact, the cash variance for the Naval Shipyards was 164
percent in the first cuarter of FY 1985. The difficulty cf
making accurate cash forecasts continues.
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The Navy Industrial Fund faces cash management chal-
lenges in two areas. First, the NIF must properly manage
the fundamental areas of efficient cash flow. Second, the
NIF must search for unique opportunities which would opti-
mize their cash iposition.
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I¥. flETBCpOLOGY
The authors of this thesis conducted their research in
five phases: literature search, Washington D.C. interviews,
research, interviews at individual activities, and findings.
The literature search phase involved the initial collec-
tion of information which included a review of previous
theses and other study efforts, a study of pertinent Federal
Government programs and policies, and a review of Navy
Industrial Fund operations including regulations, guide-
lines, audits, and financial and operating reports- The
identification of relevant material was performed through a
comprehensive computerized data base search at the Naval
Postgraduate School library using all terms likely to yield
useful information. This material was then carefully
screened and further sources identified through the refer-
ences contained withic this material. This work resulted in
an initial identification of several areas of possible cash
management problems and a determination of the scope of the
desired follow-on research.
The second phase of thesis research involved a series of
interviews in the Washington D.C. area with the fcllcwing
NIF higher commands:
Office of the Under-Secretary of the Navy
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy
Navy Accounting and Finance Center
Naval Material Coaaand Headquarters
Naval Sea Systems Command Headquarters
Naval Air Systems Command Headiiuarters
These interviews were conducted with two purposes in
mind. First, the authors desired to solidify their under-
standing of the NIF method of business, particularly at the
Activity Group comaands and up the chain-of-command.
Additionally, the interviews at these commands provided the
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authors an opportunity to observe the attitudes and ideas at
these policy-making ccmmands, particularly those personnel
involved in the NIF financial management operaticc. The
authors were able tc gain an understanding of what these
commands believed to be the financial condition of the Navy
Industrial Fund and also to gain an appreciation for what
these ccmmands believed could and would be done to alter
this financial position.
The next phase of study, the research phase, included a
thorough review of information collected during the first
two phases of study. This information was assembled and
sorted, assisting the authors in their development of
several hypotheses to be further investigated. These ideas
were tested against the information collected to date and
requirements for additional information were then identi-
fied. The additional data were then collected and the
hypotheses refined. The refined ideas were presented, in
the fcrm of telephone interviews, to selected personnel
encountered in previous interviews.
The authors next visited two west coast NIF activities,
the Naval Air Rework Facility at Alameda, California and the
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington. The
purposes of these visits were to gain an appreciation of the
working relationships between individual NIF activities and
their respective higher authorities and to obtain the views
of local commands on the cash management issue.
The final phase of study involved the listing of all
cash management opportunities identified throughout the
research. These ideas were then explored and possible
alternative actions identified and discussed. Finally, the
authors identified areas which they believed held the
greatest opportunities for enhanced cash management and
follow-cn research.
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V. PEEVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED CISH MANAGEMENT OPPOETOHITIES
A. SOHHARY
Various prograas have been designed with the Intention
of iiproving Federal cash aanagement. These prograas,
focusing on the areas of billings and collections, disburse-
ments, deposits and forecasting, each have application to
the NIF. The intent of each of these programs is to mini-
mize cash held outside of Treasury. This chapter summarizes
these eiisting inititives.
B. 07IBVIEW
During the decade of the 1970 *s, there evolved within
the Federal Government an interest in the subject of cash
management at the defartment and the agency level. The
Department of the Ireasury has been in the business of
managing the government's money for nearly 200 years. Only
recently, however, has it become obvious that there is a
need to share concern for, as well as expertise in, the
management of cash with and by other departments and
agencies.
One of the earliest efforts in this area occurred in
1971 when the Department of the Treasury created the
Eivisicn of Banking and Cash Management. Its mission
included coordinating and assisting in the design of program
agency activities which affect government cash flo« to
ensure that the government's money is effectively managed.
Additionally, this division was responsible for issuing
policy guidelines and procedural instructions to facilitate
Federal agencies in managing cash. Not surprisingly,
various studies conducted during the mid-1970 's revealed
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that there was much rcom for improvement in the entire realm
of putlic sector cash management. During the ensuing
period, a number of notable initiatives in cash management
appeared due primarily to the efforts of Treasury, the
Office of Management and Budget and the Government
Accounting Office (GAC)
.
The most noteworthy of these initiatives began with the
issuance of Treasury's Circular Number 1084 issued on
December 29, 1976. The objective of this circular was to
broaden Treasury's overview of other agencies' cash manage-
ment practices and to establish requirements so as irinimize
the gcvernment's cash held outside of of the cash account of
the Treasury. Government-wide policy guidance was provided
in the fundamental cash management areas of billings and
collections, deposits, and distursements.
The signing into law of the Prompt Payment Act of 1982
(Public law 97-177) and the Debt Collection Act of 1982
(Public law 97-365) provided two important pieces of legis-
lation to strengthen the control of Federal funds. The
Prompt Payment Act of 1982 requires Federal agencies pay
their bills on time, pay interest penalties when payments
are late, and take discounts only when the payments are made
within the discount period. The Debt Collection Act of 1582
authorizes Federal agencies to assess interest, penalties
and administrative costs on delinquent debts.
The Office of Management acd Budget amplified and imple-
mented each of these laws with the issuance of 0MB Circular
A-125 "Prompt Payment" and Bulletin 83-11 "Debt Collection"
respectively. As a result of these new laws and CME's
actions. Treasury prcnulgated a revised Chapter 8000 of Part
6, Volume I of the Treasury Financial Treasury Financial
Requirements Manual (IFBM) on May 12, 1983.
A third piece of legislation. The Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984, added to the earlier emphasis in managing cash.
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This act authorizes the Department of the Treasury to
provide the mechanistt to be used by Federal agencies to
collect receipts and the time frames for deposit of funds.
Armed with this elaborate framework of legislation.
Treasury has continued to enhance cash management. Various
sophisticated fund transfer systems have been developed and
are available for ageccies' use in collecting or disbursing
funds. These systems include:
— Treaury Financial Communications System (TFCS)
--lockbox
— Automated Clearirg House System
--Cash Concentration System
Each system will be discussed in a subsequent section. The
responsibility now rests with the individual agencies to
explore and implement the most efficient mechanism to facil-
itate the collection and disbursement of funds.
The fundamental objective of government cash management
is to ensure that the government receives full value for the
money which it owns or controls. The key to all of cash
management is control
—
you cacnot manage cash which you do
not control.
The following sections of this chapter discuss each cash
management fundamental and its applicability to the NIF.
C. BIILIHGS AHD COLIECTIONS
1 . Background
The first aspect of cash management deserving
special attention by Federal managers at all levels is till-
ings and collections. By accelerating these fundamental
elements of cash management, the Federal Government's cost
of borrowing money can be minimized.
The overview discussed the various pieces of policy
guidance and regulations encompassing this area. Those
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documents are designed primarily to ensure government agen-
cies develop effective cash management procedures.
Specifically, billings are to be prepared and transmitted
promptly. Likewise an agency's collection system must
include procedures which provide for the prompt and contin-
uing action to collect its receivables.
Included in the revised TFRM Chapter 8000, is
specific guidance concerning the timeliness of billings and
collection. Treasury has established a standard that each
invoice for goods or services furnished to individuals and
organizations outside the U.S. Government be effectuated
within one working day after the billing office is advised
that the services have been completed or the goods released
for shipment. Additionally the payment date for these goods
and services will not be more than 30 days from the date of
the invoice.
Treasury guidance also stipulates that contracts
under which goods and services are sold outside the U.S.
Government must include payment terms and provisions that
include as a minimum the following:
--Specify when the payment will be due.
— Beguire that payment be received no later than th€ due
dat€.
— Provide for payment by wire, where applicable.
--Provide that charges be applied, accrued and
collected for payments received after the due date in
the form of interest, penalty and administrative
charges.
In the event that payments owed the U.S. Government are not
made in accordance with the payment schedule stipulated in
the contract, it is the Federal Claims Collection Act (31
JJSC 3711), as amended by the Debt Collection Act of 1982
that governs the application of the above noted "late"
charges. This latter piece of legislation provides even
more stringent guidance in this area. For example. Federal
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agencies are now authorized to refer information on delin-
quent debts to consumer reporting agencies and to use
private contractors tc service and collect government debts.
The procedures used for collecting funds for credit
to the account of the U.S. Treasury are left to each respon-
sible agency to establish. In developing these procedures a
wide range of options is available including centralization/
decentralization, lockboxes, wire funds transfers and
particularly the Treasury Financial Communications System
(TFCS). The TFCS provides for the transfer of funds through
an electronic medium between the Department of the Treasury
and the banking community. Since funds are wire trans-
ferred, checks and the accompanying collection time are
completely eliminated, and funds are available on the actual
day of payment. The system offers those agencies respon-
sible for the receipt of large payments, either periodic or
a one-time remittacce, a viable means to credit the
Treasury's account. The specific procedures developed
should have as their primary goal the minimization of total
cost to the government as a whole.
2 . Potential for Saving
The acceleration and aggressive management of bill-
ings and collections can save the Federal Government a
significant amount of money, ^hat is the NIF's role in this
area in view of the fact that the vast majority of their
customers are DOD? Although ncn-DOD customers have histori-
cally represented only 0.5 percent of the customer order
dollars, even this business segment involves substantial
sums of money. For example, non-DOD customer work amounted
to $75 million in FI 1934 and is projected to account for
$55 million in the President's FY 1986 budget.
Clearly, NIF activities must provide management
attention to the prcmpt preparation and transmission of
42
tillings. Procedures must be established and monitored to
ensure this occurs. Activities must also aggressively
manage the collection of their receivables. Despite the
somewhat marginal impact of non-DOD customer dollars in the
total NIF financial picture, NIF managers cannot ignore this
aspect of cash management.
D. DISEDESEMEHTS
1 . Backgr o und
Disbursements is the second fundamental element of
cash management. To place disbursements in a proper
perspective consider the following. In FY 1977, 600 million
checks were issued by Treasury; 100,000 vouchers were paid
by Federal Reserve Banks under letter of credit; and 65
million payments were processed by wire. The timing of many
of these payments is established by law or regulations and
as such allows little management discretion with respect to
payment date. It is estimated that approximately 50 percent
of the dollar volume of all government disbursements is
subject to some degree of control with respect to timing. A
GAO survey conducted in 1978 estimated that nearly 30
percent of the Federal Government's bills (about 18 percent
of the dollar value) were paid late and about H5 percent
paid early. [Hef- 14] Clearly, such performance was costing
the Federal Government money.
The overview discussed the recent policy guidance to
correct such problems in this area. Most noteworthy, of
course, were the Prcmpt Payment Act and 0MB Circular A-125.
Hevised Chapter 8000 of the IFEM stipulates specific proce-
dures to be followed in regards to disbursements. In
particular, payment terms are to be included in any contract
or other procurement arrangement for the purchase of goods
or services from any organization outside the U.S.
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GovexDment. An agency's payment system must be designed to
provide for scheduling the issuing and mailing of checks for
receipt coincident with the invoice's due date.
Additionally, the system must incorporate procedures that
will automatically take advantage of cash discounts when it
is in the government's interest to do so.
Simply stated. Treasury advocates positive manage-
ment control of disbursements, paying bills when due, not
early or late. Payments continually made early increase the
government's overall costs and provide little incentive for
discounts. Late payments advertise governmental ineffi-
ciency, destroy public confidence and perpetrate criticism
of the Federal sectoi.
2 . fotential for Savin gs
Improved management of disbursements offers the NIF,
and in turn Treasury, an opportunity to save money. The
authors' research revealed that the NIF has historically
experienced difficulty in two specific aspects of disburse-
ments. The NIF, until 3 years ago, utilized a cumbersome
mechanical system for paying vendor bills. In 1982 a
computer tape system w .s introduced to facilitate this
process, however as of this writing only 14 NIF activities,
less than 30 percent cf the total NIF, are participating in
this program. Section C of Chapter VII discusses this
problem in -jreater detail. The second problem area for the
NIF has teen one of duplicate payment of bills. Section D
of Chapter VII discusses the impact of duplicate payments
particularly as it applies in the issue of unreconciled
cash. Correction cf the existing weaknesses in both of
these areas will serve to improve the NIF's disbursement




Another means of minimizing the Federal Government's
cost of money is the expeditious deposit of funds for credit
to the account of the Treasury Department. Treasury
Circular Number 108U and TFRM Chapter 8000 include guidance
on the matter of fund deposits- Included in the procedures
stipulated in these documents is the requirement that
government agencies develop systems which allow for the
prompt deposit of funds. These processing systems should
include an early separation of payments received from the
accompanying accounting documents, facilitating the prompt
deposit of these checks and money orders.
The Treasury Department has also established
requirements for the frequency of deposits, based upon the
daily dollar value of funds received by the depositing
organization. These basic requirements are:
— Beceipts of $1,000 or more will be deposited daily.
—Eeceipts less than $1,000 may be held until a total
of $1,000 is reached but must be deposited at least
weekly regardless of the total.
Additionally, the Treasury's regulations stipulate
requirements on the timeliness of deposits. These regula-
tions attempt to have funds deposited in a manner which
maximizes the amount an organization deposits each day,
while still making the deposit as early in the day as prac-
tical. It further establishes guidelines for dispatching
deposits which are to be mailed. Several services are
available to assist organizations in expediting their
deposits. These include depository bank accounts, lock-
boxes, and electronic funds transfers.
The Treasury Department's depository bank accounts
are part of the Treasury General Account (TGA) system.
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Here, collections are deposited by government officers
throughout the country either directly at the Federal
Reserve Bank and branches or through "flow through" accounts
maintained ty commercial depositories. The expansion of
this system to include selected commercial institutions in
addition to the 37 Federal Reserve Bank depositories assists
in accelerating the availability of funds to the Treasury
Department. The financial institutions that accept govern-
ment deposits for credit to the TGA act primarily as
conduits, accepting and processing deposited items for
collection and then transmitting them via the TGA cash
concentration network to a Federal Reserve Bank depository.
The ccmnercial depositories are often in closer proximity to
the agencies, thus providing greater convenience and
reducing the "bank flcat."
The Treasury's nationwide lockbox system enables
remittances to be mailed directly to a bank while also
providing the necessary accounting data to meet the agency's
needs. The lockboxes, which are simply locations in post
offices to which mail is sorted for pickup by a depository,
are strategically located for the collection and processing
of agency receipts. This system reduces mail, processing,
and collection time while still providing timely accounting
documentation. The system minimizes the amount cf check
handling done by an agency and improves both the audit trail
and internal controls.
Electronic funds transfers (EFT) made through the
Treasury Financial Communications System (TFCS) net only
speed up the availability of funds to Treasury, but also
simplify the accounting process. The TFCS, as a telecommu-
nications network, permits the Treasury to send and receive
EFT messages to and from any Federal Reserve Bank or
financial institution which has access to the system. In
addition to the benefits that the Treasury Department
ne
derives from the instantaneous transfer of funds, the agency
that specifies a TFCS payment receives an expedited
processing of the documentation and gains the ability to
interrogate the system on an on-line basis in order to
confirm the transaction. In 1978 the Treasury Department
estimated that on average it was saving interest costs of
three days every time the TFCS was used.
2. Potent ial for Savings
It is obvious that the acceleration of deposits to a
Treasury account can save the Federal Government a substan-
tial amount of money. But what can the Navy Industrial Fund
do to contribute to this effort? Attention to NIF payment
processing, including a quick follow-up of late payments,
certainly would assist. Beyond this, NIF should ensure that
procedures for the prompt deposit of funds are a part of
their cash management program.
While the NIF*s cash managers should use Treasury
services such as depository bank accounts and lockboxes
wherever available, they must also optimize internal cash
handling procedures. Unfortunately, the motivation to take
the steps necessary to streamline these procedures is often
lacking. Since a NIF activity receives no cost or benefit
from the value of money held outside of Treasury, they have
little incentive to add personnel or systems in order to
streamline cash handling. While these actions may be cost-
beneficial to the Federal Government, they may not be cost-
beneficial to the NIF. The single existing motivator
appears to be that the NIF use of Treasury services typi-
cally reduces an activity's accounting workload. For these
reasons, the best method of expediting deposits appears to
be through the use of government-wide regulations. These
regulations have been and will continue to be tightened in
this attempt to expedite the deposit of funds for credit to




Planning is a fundamental element of every effective
cash management program. The first step in this planning
process is the forecasting of the flow of cash and the
projection of a daily cash balance at an individual
activity. If this can be done to a reasonable degree of
accuracy, then the activity may establish a program which
minimizes their daily cash holdings. This, in turn,
contributes towards minimizing the cash held outside the
Treasury Department.
The Federal Government's cash forecasting process is
centralized in the Treasury Department under the direction
of the Fiscal Assistant Secretary. Here, projections of the
Government's daily cash flows and financing needs are made.
In order to make its forecast the Treasury relies upon the
following sources of information:
--Monthly tax receipt estimates.
— Monthly outlay plans developed by 0MB.
--Estimates of international cash movements.
--Additional information from Federal Agencies and
Eef artment s.
The Treasury Department relies heavily upon CilE's
Circular A- 112 reporting process which requires departments
and agencies to submit monthly outlay plans at the beginning
of each fiscal year. These plans are then periodically
updated. Unfortunately, their usefulness is oftec linited
as a result of late submissions, lack, of detail, and esti-
mating errors. These problems are often a result of an
agency's lack of manpower or technical capability for devel-
oping accurate forecasts.
The cost of developing a cash forecast, including
the additional personnel and equipment required for the
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forecasting process, must be absorbed by the agency. These
are not normally cost-beneficial investments from the agen-
cy's point-of-view. The agency and their activities receive
no direct benefit frcm reducing the government's cost of
money. There is little, if any, financial incentive for
activities to produce accurate, detailed outlay projections.
Since the forecasting of cash flows is universally
recognized as an imfcrtant aspect of financial management,
financial managers should not need Federal Government incen-
tives in order to improve their estimating procedures.
Included in the benefits of a sound cash forecasting program
are an improved information flow, enhanced accounting,
better organizational planning and forecasting functions,
and improved operaticcal efficiencies.
2- NIF Forecast ing
In support of the Federal Government's cash fore-
casting program, NAVCOMPT implemented the NIF Review and
Analysis Program on 19 October 1983. This program requires
a monthly and c^uarterly written analysis of variances from
the budget phasing plan. While the monthly report addresses
only variances in Accumulated Operating Results (ACR) and
activity cash, the quarterly report also reflects variances
in orders received and costs incurred,
NIF cash forecasting to date has not been very gocd.
High variances between actual and planned cash, as reported
in Chapter III, continue to be a problem. This variance was
nearly 50 percent for all NIF activities during FY 1984;
that is, total NIF cash was 50 percent higher than fore-
casted. Quarterly NIF forecasts have been no better. For
example, the Naval Shipyards forecast for the last quarter
of FY 198U was off by 132 percent.
ii9
In addition to hampering the Treasury Department's
cash management efforts, poor cash forecasts by the NIF also
interfere with internal control of NIF activities. Cash
projections, like other financial forecasts, provide useful
information which can aid NIF management in their formula-
tion cf policy. Within the NIF, there exists an opportunity
to tetter gather, report and employ available financial
data.
3 • NIZ Reporting Systems
The financial reporting system of any business
provides useful information which can aid management in
their formulation of policy and control of the organization.
The authors observed a lack of control within the Navy
Industrial Fund in regard to the development of financial
management information systems.
The NIF uses various financial management reporting
systems to assist in matters such as headquarters' planning,
structuring general ledger accounts, and accounting for
costs. Various activity segments, even within the same NIF
Activity Group, are developing customized systems. Although
production and service processes vary across the NIF, the
authors believe that a single financial management reporting
system should be adopted.
NAVCOMPT operates the Navy Industrial Fund Reporting
System (NIFRS) which receives individual NIF activity
monthly reports. The system then summarizes the data and
prepares the necessary reports to be sent to 0MB.
Additionally, NAVCOMFT, as the NIF manager, uses this system
for budget input, development, and execution. NIFRS, while
adequately serving NAVCOMPT, provides little benefit for the
individual NIF activities and the Activity Group Commanders.
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lo serve their needs, many activities and Activity
Groups have developed their own financial management
systems. The result has been the creation of many, dissim-
ilar systems including:
--NOMIS: Naval Ordnance Management Information System
— STIFS: Standard Automated Financial System
--NIFMS: NAVAIR Industrial Financial Management System
—Independent Shipyard Management Information Systems
Primarily, these systems maintain and report cost accounting
information, formatted for specific general ledger accounts.
The problem with these dissimilar systems is that
there is limited economies of scale realized. Modifications
to NIF accounting procedures would require the expensive
process of multiple program design changes. Additionally,
activity group commanders have great difficulty getting
one-time reports from these dissimilar systems.
Solutions to these problems are underway. NIFMS,
NAVAIE^s management information system, is being installed
in order to provide commonality throughout the NARFs. At
the same time, NAVCCHPT is sponsoring a similar program,
designed to provide commonality throughout the NIF. Their
system, STAFS, has already replaced the 14 separate systems
previously installed in the NIF labs. Next, it will be
installed in the ordnance facilities, replacing NCMIS,
Eventually, it will even replace the not-yet installed
NIFMS.
In conclusion, the authors believe that the NIF
system, STAFS, will provide the commonality necessary for an
effective financial management reporting system.
Unfortunately, the inplementation of this system will take
an excessively long period of time. This time consideration
enticed NAVAIR to implement their own system, adding to the
fixed costs of NIF operations.
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G. CONCIDSIOM
Billing, collecting, depositing, disbursing, ard fore-
casting cash are fundamental financial operations. Within
the Federal Government these financial operations directly
impact upon the government's cost of money. If they are
performed more effectively and efficiently, then fewer
dollars will he held outside the accounts of the Treasury
Department, thus minimizing government's borrowing.
In this chapter the authors have presented background
material on the development of government-wide initiatives
aimed at improving these cash management operations. For
each of these operations the authors also examined the NIF
interface with existing Federal programs. Surprisingly, the
results of these examinations convinced the authors that
there is little that the NIF can do to influence the effec-
tiveness of these programs.
Central to this argument is the fact that more than 99
percent of NIF's business revenue is received via a trans-
action between Treasury accounts. The funds never leave the
Treasury Department. While the authors support NIF efforts
aimed at optimizing billing procedures, insuring all collec-
tions are made, and stressing the importance of timely
deposits of funds received, it must be noted that relatively
small amounts of money are involved. The real savings
opportunities exist elsewhere.
In the area of disbursements, existing requirements such
as The Prompt Payment Act provide the necessary guidance to
insure NIF actions support the Federal Government's needs.
Even cash forecasts, identified as unsatisfactory, are
getting NIF management attention. The authors believe that
NIF fundamental cash manageuent actions, although not
optimal in every regard, are fully supportive of the govern-
ment's efforts toward minimizing the cash held outside of
the Treasury's accounts.
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The authors further believe that the Navy Industrial
Fund can indeed make significant contributions toward
reducing the amount of cash held outside the Treasury. The
greatest opportunities for these contributions are not the
cash management fundamentals discussed in this chapter, but
rather opportunities that are univ^ue to the nature of NIF
business. These opportunities are identified and discussed
in the following chapter.
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VI. IDEHTIFICATIOH Cf MIQUI £1SH MANAGEBEHT OPPOBTUHIIIES
A. UIF EEORGAHIZATICl
1 . SuBaar y
Indications are that NIF cash could be managed aore
effectively and efficiently if the activities which coiprise
the HIF were reorganized under a single command. The study
identified and explored the organizational alternatives of
remaining under the present system, abolishing the NIF
system, and reorganizing the NIF under a single command.
2 • The Org anization of th e NIF
The present structure of the NIF organization
reflects the original concept that this system was developed
as a fund rather than an industrial organization. Figure
6.1 depicts the present relationships of the various
commands which contain NIF activities. Note that the Office
of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) is shown as the lowest
common point in the NIF chain-of-command. Approximately 80
percent of revenue dollars of the NIF activity groups are
under the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) which, in turn,
falls under the comaand of the CNO. Note also that the
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) , acting as
OP-92, is shown as having a staff function at the CNO
command. However, the relationships among the commaDds
containing NIF activities are not necessarily the same as
the relationships among the activities. The actual distri-
bution cf power is quite different from what one would
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viewing Figure 6. 1, it would appear that the marage-
ment of the entire NIF organization is controlled at the
SECNAV level. This, in fact, is far from correct. Overall
management of the 49 activities which comprise the NIF is
presently provided by NAVCOMP!!. NA7C0MPT derives its power
from both the ability to control budget development and
execution and its acceptance under Title 31, U.S. Code,
Sections 1341 and 1517 (formerly E-S. 3679) of the respon-
sibility to avoid ever obligation of the NIF corpus. In
theory, a violation of this law would occur if the NIF
Treasury Cash account balance ever went negative. Accepting
this resfonsibility equates to accepting responsibility for
the financial results of NIF management actions.
The interface between NAVCOMPT, the NIF Activity
Groups, and the individual NIF activities exists in both
budget development and budget execution. In fact, the indi-
vidual activities have unique budgets which are not simply a
portion of an Activity Group budget. While the control of
budgetary decisions is a great source of power in any organ-
ization , it is even more so in the NIF. This is a result
of the financial impact that the setting of work norms and
stabilized rates has upon the performance of an activity.
"Without using the correct figures for inflation, recoupment,
payback and other key factors that are built into the rates
that are charged to the NIF customers, it is unlikely an
activity can achieve the stated objective of zero accumu-
lated operating results. Therefore, the ability to control
the setting of these factors, which are part of the budget,
essentially is control of the operation of the activity
concerned. While ret in direct control of the daily NIF
operational decisions, NAVCOMPT* s authority in the prepara-
tion of the NIF budget and their responsibility under Title
31 place them firmly in control of steering the NIF.
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In an organizational sense NAVCOMPT*s control can be
described as vertically centralized and horizontally decen-
tralized. Vertical centralization exists since little power
has been dispersed down the chain-of-command. The control-
ling actions of establishing standards, measuring perform-
ance, and particularly taking the responsibility and
authority for directing corrective actions are centered
within the NAVCOMPT office. This is unusual since, gener-
ally, comptrollers are responsible only for the design and
operation of a system which collects data and reports infor-
mation to line managers, who are responsible for the actual
control of the organization.
Extreme horizontal decentralization is in place as a
result of the control being shifted from organizational line
positions to the staff position filled by NAVCOMPT. The
cause of this decentralization apparently rests with the
establishment of an industrial fund rather than an indus-
trial organization. The bottom line is that NIF, in actu-
ality an organization, is managed by nonmanagers.
It is apparent that the task of reviewing both
performance and decision-making within the NIF has never
been clearly assigned. While activity financial results are
reviewed by NAVCOMPT and adjusting actions are iiplemented
by the same office, the process of then reviewing NAVCOMPT's
decisions has never been formalized, a problem which dates
back to the creation of The Navy Industrial Fund. ^^ihile
Congress and various governmental audit services may period-
ically review particular actions, no one seems to be moni-
toring the routine actions of NAVCOMPT. Particularly, there
appears to be no line review of the day-to-day actions taken
by NAVCOMPT in their usurped role as the NIF manager.
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3 . Alternative Crqanizations
What organizational chcices exist? Certainly it may
te argued that the present system is adequate. After all,
it has been in place for more than thirty-five years, deliv-
ering a product to its customers and adjusting as necessary
to continue to pass the solvency litmus test. During this
time revenues have scared from $26 thousand to $14 billion.
let is survival sufficient? The preceding paragraphs have
pointed cut some weaknesses that appear to be inherent to
this organizational design. Control of this organization
seems misplaced and performance results have been very
inconsistent.
The most drastic change to the NIF system would be a
legislative act abolishing the use of a revolving fund as a
way of operating industrial facilities. This would be a
case of the cure being worse than the illness. The reasons
for creating a revolving fund operation are still valid.
The buyer-seller relationships which exist, the motivation
towards efficiency, and an incentive towards minimizing
costs continue to be sound principles upon which to build an
economical, in-house industrial organization. The present
difficulties in the KIF are not inherent to the use of a
revolving fund but instead derive from problems in the
execution of this industrial operation. These problems can
be resolved without abolishing the NIF.
A reorganization ox the activities which comfrise
the NIF could be accomplished while both maintaining the
revolving fund concept and preserving the commendable goals
associated with this concept. Although this regrouping
could take many forms, reorganizing under a single ccnmand
is the most attractive option and offers the chance to
realize numerous benefits. Primarily, reorganization of the
activities under a single command would accomplish a much
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needed shift towards recognizing the industrial activities
as an industrial organization rather than considering them
only as a unique financial system. Once this mind-set has
been eliminated, the NIF can move towards a corporation-like
existence, and derive further benefits associated with teing
grouped together.
The activities of the NIF share the common otjective
of providing products without profit. The activities
compete for limited resources and face similar threats. It
seems logical then that these activities work together to
develop a strategic plan for reaching their common objec-
tive. As a single command, formalization of relationships
would be facilitated. Each command which reported tc the
same higher authority would be placed on the same management
level. Staff and line functions could be more clearly
defined and control cculd be vertically dispersed to the
point that each command would have authority to the extent
that its decisions affected the workings of other commands.
Development of an organizational manual providing
guidance on matters such as objectives for each command and
job descriptions would assist in clearly defining respcnsi-
tilities, authorities, and accountability. A single
command, organized by task, would better coordinate actions
between divisions within the NIF. The resulting consisten-
cies between divisions would then enhance efficiencies in
cash-related actions. Cash accounts could be better managed
and cash transactions monitored more effectively.
The reorgarizational choices that have been
discussed cover a wide range of possibilities. These possi-
bilities have been narrowed down to a recommendation of
organizing all NIF activities under a single command. A new
NIF command could be established as this single command, but
far less bureaucratic measures could achieve these same
results. The recently announced plan that eliminates the
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Naval Material Command and establishes a new Vice Chief of
Naval Operations for Material position would put in place an
excellent framework for establishing a line management







A primary ohjectiTe of rate stabilization was to
provide improved planning and budgeting to both the custoaer
and the individual HIF activity. Bhile the customer's
tadget process has been facilitated, the NIF has suffered a
deteriorated financial control posture. The study identi-
fied and explored tfce procedural alternatives of renaining
under the present system, eliminating stabilized rates, eind
modifying the existing process to a concept of flexible
stabilized rates.
2 Backgro und
As discussed briefly in Chapter II, prior to the
implementation of the rate stabilization program, most NIF
activities developed and revised their rates charged to
customers on a quarterly basis. Under a zero profit objec-
tive the rates were devised to return to customers any
profits previously made by the NIF activity or to recover
any losses experienced by the activity with the objective of
achieving a zero accumulated operating results account
balance at the end of the following quarter. However, given
the structure of the government's budget process, the
customer had to budget his work as much as two years before
its accomplishment. Increases in industrial fund rates due
to cost increases at the activity level often made it neces-
sary for customers to reduce their programs to remain within
their appropriated fund availability. These reductions, in
turn, created further imbalances within the NIF. These
imbalances would continue to compound themselves as their
consequences were ultimately passed back along to customers.
What were the principle causes behind the changes in
an activity's stabilized rate schedule? Three factors
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contributed to the rate schedule changes. First, acd fore-
most, was the rapidly increasing inflation rate during the
early 1970 *s. The materials and utilities employed by the
NIF activities were nest severely affected. The following
quote clearly highlights the magnitude of the inflation
problem as it was experienced by the customers of cne
activity group, the Naval Shipyards.
"In FY 1977... we have budgeted for 105 ship overhauls,
but, because we are unable to budget for inflation, we
are estimating that we will be able to accomplish only
90 overhauls."—Secretary of the Navy, J. William
Middendorf before the House Appropriations Committee,
Defense Subcommittee, February lO, i976 £Re£. 15].
The second factor involved rising labor costs, which
in the seventies accounted for approximately 50 percent of
the costs incurred hy an industrial- type activity. The
activity commander had no direct control over the wage rate
paid to his employees as these rates were set outside the
realm of his command and planning for future or anticipated
wage raises was tenuous. General Schedule (GS) employees'
salaries were established by Congressional law while admin-
istrative action at ECD set the Wage Grade (WG) salaries.
additionally, this NIF manager had virtually little
flexibility in controlling the size of his permanent work
force. Congress maintained direct control over this aspect
through personnel ceilings and constraints upon the reduc-
tion of personnel. Activity commanders did achieve seme
degree of flexibility in manpower planning by the hiring and
firing of temporary workers.
The third factor, although not receiving much
management attention prior to rate stabilization, was that
of inefficiency within an activity itself. Because an
activity could periodically adjust its rates, there was
little incentive tc measure, or be accountable for
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efficiency. Inefficiencies were simply passed along to the
customer.
As such it became evident to those at the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DON levels familiar with
the NIF mechanism that a change to the NIF-customer rela-
tionship was imperative. NAVCOMPT NOTE 7111 of 10 June 1975
announced to Navy activities the DOD requirements for the
establishment of stabilized rates, and set target dates for
their inplementation- Stabilized rates have been in effect
for all NIF activities since the start of FY 1977.
Subsequent amplifying guidance was provided in
NAVCOMPT Instruction 7600. 23B, which, in turn, was super-
ceded and incorporated in the UAVCOMPT MANUAL, Vol. 5,
Chapter 2, Part F. In particular, guidance on the develop-
ment of stabilized rates is:
The development of stabilized rates will adhere to the
principle of aligning rates to recover operating costs.
Each activity should develop a sufficient number of
rates to ensure that the rate system is a reasonable
model of the actual cost of performing the varicus
categories of work or services covered by the rates.
Stabilized rates submitted by the activities will be
reviewed by the management command and adjusted to
offset any prior year gains or losses. As a result of
these acjustments a break-even position in the
Accumulated Operating Results (AOR) account of the
activity group should be achieved. With the exception
of shipyards, gains or losses normally will be fully
offset during the second year following their
occurrence.
Rates established for NIF activities are expected to
remain in effect for the entire fiscal year. Shipyards and
NARFs, however, will use the approved rate to bill overhaul,
repair and alteration starts throughout the entire period of
the execution of the reimbursable order, regardless of the
fiscal years involved. Simply stated for the shipyards and
the NARFs, that rate once started in a fiscal year remains
in effect throughout the duration of the work accepted.
Rate changes during a fiscal year are expected to be rare.
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and may be made only upon approval of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) .
3- Eudcjet Process
Before proceeding further a brief review of the
budget process and the NIF interface is considered neces-
sary. Nir customers and their Major Claimants utilize the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process to
obtain approval and financial support of their programs in
the form of Congressional appropriations. This process
routinely encompasses more than a two year period of time
from the commencement of planning of a program to the ulti-
mate budget execution for that program. For exanple,
customer planning for the FY 1986 budget began at least by
October 1983. Programming followed planning and began in
May 1984. Budgeting commenced in September 1984 and
completed to support submission of the President's budget to
Congress in January 1985.
The NIF budget, called the A-11 Budget, is included
as a portion of the President's budget. Under the rate
stabilization concept, rates charged for services by NIF
activities are based upon the President's budget. Thus, for
example, during the summer and fall of 1984, NIF activities.
Activity Group Commanders, NAVCOaPT, DOD and 0MB reviewed
and submitted a budget for the NIF for FY 1986. Moreover,
the rat€s established reflected actual and/or projected
performance through FY 1984 and FY 1985 and were intended to
achieve a zero AGE balance for the fiscal year ending in
1986. Since numerous factors impact unfavorably on the NIF
achieving a zero AOR, a recoupment factor is incorporated in
the fcllow-on years stabilized rate to drive the AGE toward
zero. This recoupment or "payback" factor is applied en an
activity group basis and is a budgeting attempt to dampen
the oscillations which occur from year to year. The factor
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may he either postive or negative depending upon whether
that Activity Group had experienced a loss or a profit. Ihe
customer's appropriated account is simply credited or
debited, as appropriate, to adjust to the Activity Group's
recoupment factor.
^ • Inherent Problems
What then are the problems with stabilized rates?
There are three major pitfalls in the existing concept of
stabilized rates. The first weakness is one of tiling,
namely the timing of the development of the rate schedules
vis-a-vis the development of the customers' budgets. As
noted above individual NIF activities constructed their FY
1986 budget submissions during the spring of 1984 and
submitted these inputs, together with proposed rates to
their Activity Group Commanders at that time. These inputs
were reviewed and adjusted by the Activity Group during the
May/June 1984 timeframe and submitted to NAVCOMPT in June
1984. NAVCOMPT adjDSted the entire NIF budget during the
summer months and submitted a consolidated Navy budget to
DOD on 15 September 1S84. DOD then reviewed and made addi-
tional adjustments right up to the end of December 1984 at
which point they were incorporated into the President's
Budget for FY 1986.
In order for the actual FY 1986 rates to be consis-
tent with the estimates contained in the President's FY 1986
Budget, the original rates proposed by the NIF activities
(in the May 1984 timeframe) require modification to inccrjo-
rate the changes levied by Activity Group Commanders,
NAVCCMPT and DOD. Under the present system this update is
normally accomplished in the early spring of the y ear
^lloiLi^a original budget submission. Consequently, NIF FY
1986 stabilized rates were announced to NIF's local
customers during the period of April/May 1985. Since Navy
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customer budgets are priced from the "bottom up" in the
budget process, the NIF rates (for the President's fiscal
year budget) are not available to the customer at the time
of his preparation cf inputs to the President' Budget.
Eather the rates are actually available a year later, in
time for the customers construction of the follow-or fiscal
years budget (FY 1987) . In effect, although the program
stabilizes rates almost two years ahead of time, it is actu-
ally happening about a year later than is necessary to
accomplish its goals at the local customer activity level.
although NAVCCHPT attempts to balance the custoier
and NIF funding in the President's Budget, the process inva-
riably results in imbalances within the NIF. Due to the
existing timing process in the development of stabilized
rates, two major factors contribute to these imbalances
within the NIF. The first factor manifests itself due to
the existing process of applying a "directed" escalation
rate to a prior year stabilized rate. This is commonly
referred to as "under-escalated" rate stabilization. By
applying an escalaticn rate to a prior year stabilized rate,
rather than to actually experienced costs, under-escalation
results, and builds in a Nil loss. This has also been
called "bottom-lining", that is setting rates to achieve a
certain bottom line figure, without regard to what the
actual costs had been. This practice impedes the breakeven
concept of the NIF by not allowing adjustments for previous
losses in formulating its rates. The second factor results
from incorrect assumptions being incorporated into the rate
development. This problem is particularly sensitive to
actual price increases in material and labor. The stabi-
lized rate is developed using 2-year old prices plus an
escalaticn factor. Should prices increase dramatically, as
has been the NIF's experience with material in the early
1980' s, the stabilized rates have a built-in loss incorpo-
rated into them.
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Ihe impact of both of these factors was highlighted
recently as the result of an audit conducted in the NAEFs by
the Naval Audit Service. The cumulative Treasury cash
balance for all six NARFs as of 30 September 1983 was a
negative $197.2 million of which a loss of $154.6 million
was incurred in FY 1983 alone. Of this figure, it is esti-
mated that the application of a directed escalation rate
alone accounted for $67.1 million. As far as unanticipated
material price increases, NAEF FY 1933 material costs were
based on FY 1981 standard prices plus escalation factors of
8.4 percent for FY 1982 and 10.9 percent for FY 1983.
Actual material purchases at the NARFs in FY 1 983 netted a
22.2 percent increase over FY 1982 prices for a built in
loss cf 11.3 percent over the FY 1983 escalation guidance
of 10-9 percent. For example, NARF Norfolk experienced
material prices in FY 1983 that were 5 1.3 percent over FY
1982 prices while NARF Jacksonville experienced an increase
of nearly 30 percent. It is estimated that actual material
increases over material escalation guidance allowed
accounted for $28.6 million, or nearly 19 percent, of the
NARFs FY 1983 loss. [Hef- 16]
5 . Recoupment
UAVCOMPT's method of compensating for these "eld
errors" is the recoupment factor. As discussed above the
factor is applied on a group basis rather than on an indi-
vidual activity basis. Different Activity Groups receive
different rates. As such, for the shipyards a single
payback factor is applied across all eight shipyards
combined while in the case of the Naval Air Rework
Facilities an entirely different factor is applied across
the six NARFs. Then within each Activity Group, each indi-
vidual activity applies the sane factor.
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Com^'Utation of this group payback factor is
straightforward. For the shipyards, the Activity Group's
total AGE is divided ty the direct labor mandays in the next
year's program to produce a positive or negative factor.
The NARF*s computations are similar, substituting simply
direct labor manhours rather than mandays as the divisor.
This factor is then added to, or subtracted from, the stabi-
lized rates developed to arrive at the rate which will actu-
ally be charged to the customer.
For example, a recoupment factor of 30.7 percent was
incorporated into the NARF*s stabilized rates for FY 1985 to
remedy that Activity Group's significant negative cash posi-
tion at year ending II 1983. This approach in attemptiEg to
bring AGE to a zero value has received wide spread criticism
from the GAG and at the individual activity level. The
criticism centers on the point that the group payback factor
stifles the initiative of the individual activities'
Commanding Officer and restricts his control of his own
operating results.
A significant change to the existing payback concept
is planned commencing in FY 1986. For those activity groups
having a positive AGE at fiscal year end, the AORs will be
aggregated and spread across the entire NIF. The objective
will be to bring any activity group with a negative AGE to a
zero value. Any ACR remaining after "zeroing out" all
Activity Groups will be paid back in a lump sum to a custom-
er's account. In the event that total NIF AGE were to go
negative, an infusion of cash would be necessary. Such an
infusion would be provided the NIF in the form of a supple-
mental appropriation requiring Congressional approval.
The second weakness in the existing concept of
stabilized rates involves the lack of any adjustment mecha-
nism within the NIF to compensate for customer changes to
previously planned workload levels. Customer program
68 I
reductions and work withdrawals severely impact upon the
NIF*s cash position. The underlying principle is that an
activity's stabilized rate is set to cover both fixed and
variable costs at a specific volume to breakeven. Fixed
costs, of course, remain, even at volume levels lower than
planned. Fith no mechanism to adjust to this dilemma, the
NIF absorbs the loss in AOE.
Customer program reductions are common. One such
case occurred recently at NAHF Alameda. That activity's FY
1985 budget was developed predicated upon customer loading
of 4556 million man-hours of work. The A- 1 1 Budget set NAfiF
Alameda's workload at 4334 million man-hours. However, due
to program reductions that activity is now only funded for
4058 million man-hours, a man-hour reduction of 1 1 percent
below the level included in the development of their stabi-
lized rates. Such reductions result in an automatic loss to
the NIF activity unless the activity can effect fixed and
variable cost reductions or improve labor productivity or
both.
Finally the third major problem resulting from rate
stabilization is the frustration and rather substantial loss
of autonomy experienced by the individual NIF activities.
These aspects are a direct outgrowth of the existing process
whereby the rates charged represent modifications by the
Activity Group Commander, NA"VCOMPT and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to those proposed by the individual NIF
activity. As a result of this centralized decision making,
individual NIF activity commanders do not directly determine
the final rates or have the authority to change the rates
when assumptions vary. In essence the key issue is one of
controllability. These individuals are no longer in control
of the inflow of resources to their command and cannot
control the most significant factor which drives profit or
loss for a particular period. The activity's cash balance
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is also largely beyond their control. In spite of the lack
of this aspect of ccntrol, the NIF activity commander is
evaluated with the financial position of the individual
activity as a significant factor. In fact, NARF Commanding
Officers are presently evaluated on five key financial indi-
cators: (1) Activity Cash, (2) Treasury Cash, (3) ACE, (4)
Inventory and (5) Productivity Eatio. In the case of the
shipyard Commanding Officer, delivering a quality product,
on time to the custcmer is more important than his activi-
ty's financial position.
6 . Alternatives
What aanagement alterratives exist in regards to
rate statilization? Of course it may be argued that the
present system is adequate. After all it has been in effect
throughout the NIF fcr eight years with comparatively few
changes. Despite the weaknesses discussed in the previous
paragraphs, most observers would agree that it has served
its principal purpose— enhanced customers support. Most
importantly, fleet readiness has improved. Ship overhauls
and aircraft reworks that are planned are being accom-
plished. From this viewpoint the Navy's image before
Congress has improved. It is rare that the Navy has to
report incomplete programs which require additional funding
to bring to a conclusion. The Navy is now able to show
Congress that the programs that are planned, and which they
have authorized, are being executed in a timely manner.
Ihe most radical choice is the elimination of stabi-
lized rates. If this alternative was pursued, there is
little doubt that everyone involved, NIF activities and
customers alike, would be thrust into a pre-1976 position.
Flexibility in the NIF's financial management posture would
be enhanced, however, at the serious detriment of the
customer.
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The remaining alternatives center on modifying the
present system in sone manner. One sucii choice would be to
impose a straight-forward penalty to the customer for work-
load changes. This concept would entail the NIF activity
and the customer entering into what in essence would be a
"contract" for a projected, firm workload prior to the
activity's development of its rates. Subsequent changes to
this contracted workload for any reason, whether it be
customer initiated or Congressionally-driven, would incur a
penalty. The penalty, a lump sum differential, would be
paid from the appropriate customer account (0&M,N etc.)
This approach would shift the planning risk toward the
customer. However, given the existing budget process,
particularly its final sensitivity to political influences,
this alternative appears unattractive and would unfairly
penalize the customer for workload changes beycnd his
control.
A second modification variation could involve the
NIF utilizing a flexible stabilized rate approach. Eased
upon the customer's initially planned workload, the activity
could establish a specific rate, much like what occurs pres-
ently. However, the activity would take the process one
step further and develop and provide the customer additional
rates based upon the impact of potential program reductions
or additions. A zero AOR could theoretically be achieved
for any work level selected by the customer. The customer
would then have a series of rates with which to develop and
defend his budget. As the customer's budget is reviewed and
potential changes considered, knowledge of the appropriate
rate which will be charged for any activity level being
evaluated will facilitate budget decisions by those in the
review process. Depending upon the final activity level
established for the customer's budget, application of the
appropriate stabilized rate will provide a program's
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ultimate budget cost. The odus would be placed where it
clearly belongs, on the customer, to optimize his needs for
services and products against available funds. The customer
will be required to become more conscious of financial
management matters as they affect the NIF and the NIF will
no longer be expected to absorb the large annual fluctua-
tions currently being experienced. Congress would get a
more accurate picture of what program results they are actu-
ally achieving and the true cost to Treasury of these
programs.
Subsequent to the execution of the budget, the
process of workload changes could be handled in one of two
methods. The concept of flexible rates could be extended to
cope with customer workload reductions thereby providing the
NIF with a protective mechanism. In the event of program
additions, as was the case of NARF Alameda in late FY 1983
with the additional customer input of 1 3 S-3 aircraft, the
flexible stabilized rate concept could also be utilized,
however the authors see little advantage here. Rather, for
program additions, utilization of the stabilized rate stipu-
lated at budget execution would suffice as long as the NIF
activity was provided additional customer funding. In NARF
Alameda's case, no additional funding was provided thereby
contributing to that activity's $30 million loss in FY 1983.
A third modification variation could involve
utilizing stabilized rates for only direct labor and factory
overhead. These two elements have historically been more
predictable and subject to better planning and control than
direct material. Material prices would be based upon the
most current prices available. Adopting this approach to
the development of stabilized rates would necessitate a more
complex process yet ninimize yearly fluctuations by elimi-
Jiating that cost element most sensitive to unanticipated
market changes. This approach could be utilized on a
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"stand-alone" basis, that is maintaining the fundamentals of
the existing stabilized rate program, excepting material, or
it could be further refined and tailored to interface with
the concept of flexible rates.
Ihe procedural changes that have been discussed span
a wide range of possibilities. Any change will reguire OSD
support and approval. The alternatives have been narrowed
to a recommendation of performing budget develofment
employing the flexible stabilized rate concept and budget
execution using a single, fixed rate "contracted" for at
execution. It is the authors' opinion that this alternative
would still provide the primary objective of rate stabiliza-
tion, improved custoner planning and budgeting, while mini-
mizing the yearly fluctuations in NIF cash.
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The size of the corpus has decreased significantly
since that originally appropriated by Congress in FY 1950
while the naaber of BIF activities and their annual voluae
of business has draaatically increased. The study explored
the appropriateness of corpus size in terms of its purpose
in supporting the HIF's planned level of operations.
The corpus fiovides that source of funds ty which
the NIF, as a revolving fund, can meet its operating
expenses incurred during the performance of assigned work-
Reimtursement of the depleted corpus is achieved by billing
the customer, most commonly accomplished on a progress
payment hasis.
2 . The Appropri ated Corpu s
The NIF's initial capitalization occurred in FY 1950
and was provided by Congress in an appropriation slightly in
excess of $U80 million. Since that original appropriation
the size of the corpus has decreased to its current FY 1985
size of just less than $284 million. While the corpus has
experienced a reduction by nearly half, the number of NIF
activities has steadily increased to the current 49 activi-
ties. Simultaneous with the fund*s expansion to include
more industrial and commercial-type activities, the KIF*s
annual revenues have grown dramatically from a meager
S26,000 in FY 1951 to over $14 billion in FY 1984. Table
VIII provides a history of the corpus size and annual
revenue of the Navy Industrial Fund from its inception.
As indicated in Table VIII the greatest amount of
corpus reduction occurred between Fiscal Year 1956 and
Fiscal Year 1970. In particular, during the period 1956
through 1968 over $294 million was transferred out of the
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TABLE Till
IIF Corpus an d Bevenue History
($ in millions:)
Fiscal Year Corpus Revenue












1962 301. 1 1, 889.
1963 280.4 2,154.
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D.C., for the Fiscal Years 1952--1985.
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fund of which $197 million was transferred to the Military
Personnel, Navy appropriation- During this same period of
time, the number of KIF activities and the NIF revenue were
increasing, generating a need for more working capital
rather than less. The end result was a serious cash flow
problem which peaked in FY 1964. Compounding the the
problem was another reduction to the corpus in 196U, on this
occasion to :';190.U million. The ensuing cash flow problem
resulted in a significant change to the NIFs operating
procedures. Beginning in FY 1964 the NIF terminated the
concept of progress payments and went to a system of
customer prepayments.
Under the earlier progress payment system the
customer had been billed for the product or service by the
NIF activity as wcrk progressed and was ultimately
completed, Onder the new prepayment concept the customer
paid in advance for any work or service. This cash-in-
advance method of doing business guickly solved the NIF's
cash flow dilemma and provided the fund with more working
capital than it had since its inception. The NIF's cash
position ballooned tc more than one billion dollars shortly
after the prepayment system was adopted.
However, while the prepayment system eased the cash
flow problem, it created several significant inefficient
management practices which were to cause further problems
for the fund.
The first inefficiency observed was that NIF
activity inventories were drastically increased. For
example, from 30 June 1963 to 31 December 1967, NIF activi-
ties increased their raw material inventories from $109
million to S223 million, over a 100 percent increase in a
four and one-half year period. The second inefficient
management practice noted was that NIF activities slackened
control of their billings. Having a large amount of working
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capital available led activities to not expedite customer
billings. For example, billings during this same period
averaged approximately 23 days. £Ref. 17]
As a result cf the impact of these two practices the
NIF returned to progress payment procedures on 31 May 1968.
The inmediate effect of going back to progress payments,
however, was a reduction in working capital. In order to
avoid placing the furd in the same cash flow situation as
had been experienced in FY 1964, $158 million was trans-
ferred into the NIF ccrpus in FY 1971 from DOD Stock funds.
Progress payments remain today as the primary method by
which nearly all NIF activities bill their customers.
3 . Al location of the Corpus
Ihe total NIF corpus is initially allocated within
Navy by KAVCOMPT to the individual Activity Groups. This
allocation is further subdivided within an Activity Group
and distributed to each individual activity based ufon
NAVCOMPTs and the Activity Group Commanders forecast of each
activity's volume of business. Table IX provides the ccrpus
breakdown in FY 1985 en an Activity Group basis and Table X
provides an example cf the further sub-allocation of the
corpus within one particular Activity Group, the Naval
Shipyards.
U . The Perceived Corpu s
Whereas the previous section discussed the history
of the NIF*s appropriated corpus and its current fiscal year
size of $283.8 million, the actual NIF cash position as of
30 September 1984 was $807.9 million. This significant
difference between corpus size and the actual cash on hand
has resulted from OSC-directed guidance to NAVCOMPT and has
led to a false perception on the part of many as to the




IIF Corpus lllocation by Activity (Sroup

















Source: Department of the Nav
Comptroller, Navy Ind







The NIF's large cash position can be traced to CSD
actions commencing in the early 1980's. In FY 198 1 CSD
directed that the NIF capitalize the fund's AOE. This
action was the initial financial thrust in preparation for
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Navy, Office of the
Industrial Fund Report-
d en^ed Jl December lya^.no
the NIF's asset capitalization program discussed in Chapter
II. The action resulted in $12.8 million being capitalized
into a reserve account entitled 'Reserve for Fixed Assets*.
In FY 1982 OSD's policy guidance to the NIF was to capi-
talize the AOR of any activity having a year ending positive
AOR. Any negative AOR was passed along to the customer
through the stabilized rate program. This policy provided
the mr $300 million into the equity reserve account. CSD*s
guidance to the NIF was modified in FY 1983 when the NIF was
again directed to capitalize its positive AOR, this time,
however, at the Activity Group level. This action resulted
in an additional $200 million being capitalized into the
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equity reserve account. Thererore, as of 30 September 1984,
the NIF's equity reserve control account. General Ledger
Account (GLA) 2970, contained $552.3 million.
Herein lies the crux of the misunderstanding cf the
NIF*s cash position issue. The cash identified in GLA 2970
as a result of the caf italizaticn of AOE should be earmarked
for specific purposes and not used to support the organiza-
tion's operations. These operations are supported by the
corpus. let, a review of GLA 2970 reveals the existence of
inappropriate sut-acccunts. In particular, the following
sub-accounts comprise GLA 2970:
GLA 2S71 Capital Equipment Purchases
GLA 2972 Backload of Major Maintenance 5 Repairs
GLA 2973 Miner Construction
GLA 297U Cash Level Eeguirements
GLA 2S75 Software Systems Development
As can be seen from the sub-account titles, the
specific purposes identified for the cash in GLA 2S70
include items directly associated with operations. Por
example, sub-account GLA 2974 is used to maintain a positive
working capital at each activity. Additionally, the authors
believe that the value of GLA 2970 is over stated as a size-
able portion of these funds have already been obligated.
Furthermore, "counting" the cash provided for the asset
capitalization program from capitalized AOR causes a
distorted picture when evaluating the NIF's cash position,
lihat is the cash in GIA 2970 being used for?
The authors' research has substantiated little
connection between the AOR capitalized into the equity
reserve accounts and the reality of the existing process by
which the IIIF is fiocurring replacement capital assets.
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Eather the customer is still paying for these new assets
through the stai)ilized rate. This is accomplished by
including toth depreciation charges on the "older" equipment
and adding a reserve surcharge (allowance for inflation) in
the stabilized rate, an action implemented by NAVCOMFT in FY
1985. This surcharge for future equipments is billed to all
customers, except Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and private
party customers. The result is an inflated stabilized rate
paid by the customer.
In summary, the size of the Congressionally approved
corpus, and the actual amount of available working capital
are quite different. The authors therefore conclude that
the program of capitalizing NIF profits really was a plcy to
increase the corpus without requiring a Congressional
appropriation.
5- Ihe Optimal Corpus
Given this background on the NIF's cash posture the
pertinent question remains: What is an appropriate size for
the corpus? Before this question can be answered some
fundamental issues must first be addressed. The first issue
centers on the timing of NIF billing and the collection of
payments for corpus reimbursement.
Theoretically, if billing and collection could be
accomplished simultaneously, and payments cover all costs,
there would be no need for the corpus. The Treasury cash
account could be reduced accordingly thereby saving the
governmect money. Of course, from a practical viewpoint we
know that this is not feasible, at least not today.
Before exploring the nature of the billing process,
the authors posed the more fundamental question as to how
many days of cash should be on hand within the corpus with
which to conduct business. Armed with the answer to this
question the authors hoped then to evaluate the
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effectivecess of the NIF's current approach to billing.
However, no definitive standard could be found. The issue
of exactly how much cash should be on hand at any given time
has not been addressed. Rather the authors heard a variety
of opinions from within the NIF management hierarchy ranging
from a goal of 45 working days downward to 10-11 working
days.
Exploring each of the alternatives suggested, the
authors could find dccumentable support for only the 10-11
working day viewpoint. In 1969 a SECNAV Ad Hoc panel formed
to assess the NIF's health recommended that this standard be
established. Inherert in this recommendation was the NIF's
billing system in place at that time, strictly mechanical in
nature, and the concection of this timeframe to the NIF's
two major, and occasionally three, monthly cash conmitments
for paydays for the workforce. £Eef. 18]
Accepting the 10 day objective for the moment and
assuming a daily revenue of 318 million in FY 1969, the
corpus should have been approximately $180 millioD in that
year. A review of lable VIII reflects that in FY 1969 the
corpus was $185.8 million. Remember, however, that as
previously discussed the NIF was about to return to a system
of progress payments at this time. To avoid the impending
cash flow dilemma which becomes evident in FY 1970, an infu-
sion of $158 million was appropriated for the NIF in FY
1971. As can be observed in Table XI this infusion provided
the NIF a more than adequately sized corpus until FY 1978.
The authors have previously discussed in Section 3 those
actions implemented by OSD to deal with apparent corpus
shortfalls commencing in FY 1981.
Since FY 1979 the NIF has experienced progressively
larger and larger corpus shortfalls as annual revenues have
risen. ^ith an annual revenue of $7,214 million in FY 1979,
there existed an appropriated corpus shortfall of $6.
2
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1985 of $14.5 billicn, this shortfall has ballooned to
$276.2 million. Distinguishing the NIF's cash between cash
in corpus and cash earmarked for the asset capitalization
program highlights this alarming trend.
6 . Improved Bi llin^ Procedures
It must be emphasized, however, that the corpus
shortfalls that began in FY 1979 and have continued until
today are based upon the NIF's 10 working day mechanical
billing cycle of the mid-1960*s. As noted above this
unwritten standard continues to prevail today due to the
absence cf any updated direction on this subject. One would
hopefully expect current state of the art billing systems to
be able to improve ujon this thumbrule thereby reducing the
level of cash required on hand. For the most part this has
not been the case within the NIF. Although some strides
have been made in this area, progress has been particularly
slow throughout the NIF. One such program offering signifi-
cant potential in this area but highlighting the resistence
to changeover is the NIF's computer tape exchange program.
Implemented nearly 3 years ago, the concept reduces the
input tine of the iianual preparation of billings. When
fully on line each NIF activity will simply prepare a
computer billing tape with which to pay a vendor bill. The
data contained on the tape is then automatically transmitted
to the Financial Information Processing Center (FIPC) for
processing. Prior to this program each FIPC manually
reviewed hundreds of hard copy billings daily, extracted the
data necessary, and finalized the billing process. As of
May 1985, only 14 NIF activities have implemented this
program. Table XII provides a summary of the status of this
program NIF-wide.
The authors do not mean to blindly imply that all
NIF activities should be utilizing the tape exchange
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TABLE XII
HIP'S Tape Exchange Prograa Status
ACTIVITY IMPLEMENTED NOT IMPLEMENTED




HARP NORTH ISIANE X
NARF JACKSONVILLE X
NAVAL AVIONICS CIR X
NATC PAX RIVER X
NAPC TRENTON X
KAEC lAKEHORST X
FMTC PT. MUGU X
NADC WARMINISTER X
NCSC PANAMA CITY X
NCSC SAN DIEGO X
NSREC CARDEROCK X
NSWC SILVER SPEIKG X
NUSC NEWPORT X
NWC CHINA LAKE X
NRL WASHINGTON X





PWC GREAT LAKES X
PWC SAN DIEGO X
PWC SAN FRANCISCO X
PWC PEARL HARBOR X
IWC GUAM X
PWC SDBIC BAY X
SPYD POETSMOOTH X
SVYL NORFOLK X
SPYD PEARL HARBOR X
SEYD PHILADELPHIA X
SPYI CHARLESTON X
SPYD LONG BEACH X
SPYD MAEE ISLAND X
SEYE PUGET SODNE X
NWS SEAL BEACH X
NWS YORKTOWN X
NWS CHAELESTON X
NWS COLTS NECK X
SSWSES PT. HUENEtE X
NWSC CRANE X





proc/ram. The specific nature of each individual activity's
tusiness (volume, ccntractural arrangements and type of
tilling) must be evaluated. From this evaluation a cost-
henefit analysis of a computer tape tilling system should be
performed prior to a final determination. The point,
however, is that with less than 30 percent of the NIF activ-
ities currently participating in this program sizeable room
for improvement and cash savings may exist. This program is
but one example within the spectrum of billing which impacts
upon the size of the corpus.
7 . Conclusions
The ambiguities and misperceptions surrounding the
NIF's corpus have been identified and addressed.
Determining the optimal size of the corpus is a furtile area
warranting further research. Given the existing billing
systen and the philosophy underlying this aspect of the
movement of cash, both into and out of the NIF, the authors
conclude that the present corpus of $283.8 million is inade-
quate to conduct business. Establishing two separate cash
accounts within the NIF would highlight this point and
facilitate enhanced management focus on this matter.
Currently there is so much "leeway" in the asset capitaliza-
tion program that optimizing the corpus size is simply over-
shadowed. However, it is OSD's present position of
maintaining only one cash account within the NIF sc as not
to flag this issue tc Congress. A re-evaluation of this
policy is considered necessary.
The NIF*s billing system also deserves further
study. Many individuals within the NIF believe that the
only matter that really counts is the amount posted in the
Treasury cash account at the end of each month. Their logic
then concludes that the NIF's existing concepts on billing
are adequate. The authors do not concur with this
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viewpoint. The potential to iirprove cash management in this
area and optimize the size of the corpus clearly exists.
Parochial thinking sinply rationalizes away the NIF»s impact
upon Treasury's cash position-
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Ihe authors telieve that redactions in an activity's
unreconciled cash would result in cash savings for the indi-
vidual activity, the entire NIP, and the Treasury
Departnent. The authors further believe that these reduc-
tions could be brought about by a combination of heightened
management attention, improved reconciliation procedures,
and increased involvement by the finance activities.
2 J!h§ t is Unrecoiici led Cash?
Unreconciled cash is, simply put, the difference
hetween the amount of cash an individual NIF activity
believes it has (termed activity cash) and the actual amount
credited to that activity's cash account at the Treasury
Department (termed Treasury cash) . Although nearly all NIF
activity cash receipts are transfers from other Treasury
Department accounts, the size of the unreconciliation is
very important. The law limits the NIF by allowing expendi-
tures onli of those funds available in their Treasury
account- Additionally, unreconciled cash could include
erroneous or illegal transactions.
While the Treasury Department monitors only the
total NIF cash account balance, the Navy Accounting and
Finance Center (NAFC) more closely monitors and reports each
individual NIF activity's allocated share of this Treasury
Department cash talance through the Centralized
Expenditure/Reimbursenent Processing System (CEEPS)
.
Although there is an unavoidable time lag between actual
changes to the Treasury cash account and the recording of
these changes in CERES, for the purposes of this discussion
it is safe to refer to the CEBPS balance as Treasury cash.
Thus, unreconciled cash is the difference between activity
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cash and Treasury cash and CEEES is the system the Navy uses
to track its components.
3. So urce s of Unreconci led Cash
Unreconciled cash has numerous causes. Primarily,
activity cash exceeds Treasury cash because of charges made
against the account of a particular activity within the
preceding 30 days fci which the activity has no knowledge.
These transactions are termed "undistributed disbursements"
and are hy far the largest component of unreconciled cash.
Since the processing cf an individual NIF activity's routine
cash transactions are accomplished by finance centers there
is a time lag between the actual payment/collection and the
receipt of the related documentation by the concerned
activity. Until these documents are processed and forwarded
to the individual activity, the activity will have nc knowl-
edge of the transaction has been completed. Thus, undistri-
buted disbursements are created. While this situation is
considered an unfortunate consequence of this particular
business practice, the problem has been compounded by the
unnecessarily slow processing of the transaction documents.
The remaining sources of unreconciled cash include
anything else which would cause activity cash and Treasury
cash to be out of balance. These other sources include
recent invalid charges against an activity, invalid collec-
tions made by an activity, or unmatched ma terial-in- transit.
These secondary sources are classified as "unresolved trans-
actions". (The terms "unidentified transactions" and "unal-
located costs" are also used)
.
Unresolved transactions are eventually posted to an
appropriate General Ledger Account (GLA) in order to reduce
the amount of the unreconciliation. The three General
ledger Accounts for this purpose are:
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GIA 1493 Mat€rial-in-Transit—Unmatched
GLA 1542 Unallocated Cost--Unmatched Other
GLA 1543 Unallocated--Refunds/Collections
The result of posting unresolved transactions to a GLA is
that the amount of unreconciled cash approaches equalling
the amount of the undistributed disbursements.
As an illustration. Table XIII details 434 unrecon-
ciled cash items at one NIF activity that were over 90 days
old as of 31 August 1983. These items were valued at a
total of $9.6 1 million and dated as far back as February
1980. Ihis total is significant, particularly when compared




Onreconciled Cash Items at
Puget Sonnd Naval Shipyard
($ in millions)
PROBLEM
Paynent not yel processed to





Excess or duplicate payments 61 1.30
Receipt missing cr not processed 46 1.23
Unable to identify/no back-up 185 0.85
Erroneous charge against activity 71 0.58
Contract (or mod) not received 59 0.27





'*• I^§ Cost of Unreconciled Cash
The problems associated with iinreconciled cash and
unresolved transacticcs are much more than just the nuisance
of their presence. These items cost individual NIF activi-
ties, the entire NIF, and the Treasury Department a substan-
tial amount of money each year.
The costs of unreconciled cash fall largely upon the
individual NIF activity as they must bear the burden of
resolving the discrepancies. It is not unusual for a large
NIF activity to have two or three personnel working full
time in the area of processing unreconciled cash items. lor
the entire NIF, this total would exceed 100 persons. Often
activities find it cheaper to attempt obtaining NAFC
approval for a write-off of items whose reconciliation
appears to be excessively complicated or costly. If unable
to justify a write-off, activities may simply give up on the
reconciliation and allow these items to age. The Navy
Accounting and Finance Center reports that:
A review of the Industrial Fund cash reconciliations in
the June 198U Financial and Operating Statements indi-
cates unresolved disbursements ranging from $10 to$4,000,000 with some being over three years old
[Eef. 19].
Unresolved transactions cost the NIF organization
through unwarranted expenditures for duplicate, excessive,
or otherwise improper disbursements, and the extraordinary
number of man-hours required to discover, investigate, and
correct these transactions. The difficulty in reconciling
these items and the fact that many activities choose not to
attempt reconciliation, finding it easier to simply accept
the charge to their account, opens the door for possible
improprieties such as unauthorized purchases or intentional
mischarging of activity cash accounts.
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Invalid collections and payments have numerous
possible causes. These include duplicate or excessive
payments to customers, charges to a NIF activity for goods
or services received by a non-NIF activity, or charges to
one NIF activity for goods or services received fcy another
NIF activity. Unmatched material-in-transit (MIT) occurs
when materials are received from a government supplier but
cannot be matched to an activity's material reguisitioc.
How severe is the problem? An accounting officer at
one NIF activity estimates that they disburse as much as
$100,000 each year without adequate support or explanation.
5 . The Si ze of the Problem
The dollar differences between activity cash and
Treasury cash are sizable. Table XIV presents the undistri-
buted disbursements data for selected NIF Activity Groups
for FY 1983 and FY 198U, as reported in the NIF Financial
and Operating Statements.
The figures presented in Table XIV include both
collections and payments made by a finance center on behalf
of an individual activity. The preponderance of negative
numbers means that the undistributed amount paid out exceeds
the undistributed anount taken in. Additionally, the
negative values depicted in the table would be greater if
not somewhat reduced in size by the amount of these collec-
tions. For example, as of 31 August 1984, the Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard cash account reconciliation contained $20.3
irillicn of expenditures recorded by CEEPS but not by the
activity cash account and $2. 1 million of collections
recorded by CERPS but not the activity. These sum to $22.4
million but net out to only $18.2 million, the reported




for Selected NIF Activity Groups
($ in millions)
ACTIVITY GICUP 30 SEP 1983 30 SEP 198U
SHIPYARDS -148 -65
NARFS -10 -19







Note: Negative figures mean activity cash is
greater than Treasury cash.
breakdown of these figures is not included in the NIF
Financial and Operating Statement. If this breakdown were
available then the addition of the absolute values of these
figures would better support the point. Still, the data in
the table are sufficient to put forward the argument that
the amount of undistributed disbursements is significant.
For the years shown, net undistributed disbursements
equalled 3.8 percent of FY 1983 revenue dollars and 3.5
percent of FY 1984 revenue dollars,
6 . The Reconcil iation Pro cess
Thus far we have discussed the causes and costs
associated with unreconciled cash and presented data in
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order to demonstrate the size of the problem. But how are
these discrepancies corrected? Unfortunately, reconcilia-
tion is often a tedious, time-consuming and expensive
process.
The reconciliation procedure retjuires that the indi-
vidual NIF activity initiate the corrective effort ard the
involved financial center(s) then provide the requested
documentation. For example, an individual NIF activity
could receive a document reflecting a payment made on their
behalf by their finance activity for materials that the
activity never ordered or received. The NIF activity must
then obtain all documents necessary to resolve the dispute.
These light include information on what the material was,
who the supplier was, and where the material was actually
delivered. This required support from non-NIF activities
has proven to be quite an obstacle in the reconciliation
task. The financial centers maintain the back-up, detailed
records for no longer than cne year from the time of a
particular transaction. In fact, most hold these records
for a considerably shorter period. Reconstruction of trans-
actions after this holding period requires the retrieval of
information from a record holding center. In addition to
involving yet another party in this job, this retrieval is
also a very time consuming, costly chore. Thus, the longer
the reconciliation process takes, the more difficult and
expensive it becomes to resolve the discrepancy.
The Navy Accounting and Finance Center recognizes
that unreconciled cash is a problem and has established new
accountin g procedures in an attempt to reduce the size
(dollars) of unreconciled cash and to assist in dealing with
ajed (over 90 days eld) unreconciled cash items. Ihese
procedures, issued 13 November 1984, include new posting
guidance for unresolved transactions (described previously)
,
allow individual activities a one-time write-off of
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unreccnciled cash items that are less than $1,000 and dated
prior to December 1983, and also allow activities to forward
to NAFC items that are $1,000 or greater and dated pricr to
1983. Finally, as items now become over 90 days old they
are eligible for a new process which allows them tc be
forwarded tc NAFC, via the chain-of-command, for reconcilia-
tion. NAFC, with greater resources and more clout, may be
able to process some troublesome reconciliations more effec-
tively and efficiently than lower level commands. For an
item to be eligible for this procedure however, the activity
must have met several requirements designed to insure that
they have first attempted reconciliation at their level.
The apparent goal of NAFC's initiative is to enable indi-
vidual activities to concentrate their efforts on current
reconciliations.
Additionally, unresolved cash transactions that have
been posted to an appropriate general ledger account will be
identified and included in a special section of the
Financial and Operating Statements, and broken down by the
age of the item. All of these new NAFC policies have been
implemented and will te incorporated into the next change to
the NAVCCMPT Manual.
7. Suggestions fcr Improvement
Despite NAVCCMPT's efforts, the NIF continues to
experience problems in the processing of cash transactions.
In their 10 January 1985 letter to their subordinate Systems
Commands the Naval Material Command stated that many activi-
ties have given up and "...do nothing and wait for standard
operating procedures to correct the errors." [Ref- 20]
Other activities have well-established procedures
for reconciliation yet find their inquiries unanswered by
financial centers ci the data provided by the finance
95
activities incomplete or incorrect. These activities spend
much mere on reconciliation without necessarily receiving a
significant increase in their success rate. This causes
great frustration. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard complained to
NAVCCMPT that;
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has aggressively follo\jed-up
by letter and telephone, including contact with FIPC
goints-of-contact provided by Mr. Don Jacobs of
AVCOMPT. Although there was brief improvement, the
situation has returned to the previous unacceptable
condition. Many telephone calls are not returned and
there is no response to second and third follcw-up
letters or Naval Speedletters which have gone unan-
swered. Enclosure (2) (not provided} represents a
reguest sent out en 29 August 1984 with a follow-up
request sent on 8 November 1984. The requested informa-
tion was not released by lAADCLANT until 4 December
1934. During the period 1 August 1984 to 31 October
1984 this activity forwarded 119 requests for back-up,
corrections, contract copies, etc. This additional work
is time consuming and often compounded by unreturned
telephone calls cr unanswered follow-up letters.
[Ref. 21]
The unreconciled cash problem is a cloud over the
NIF organizations. It presents a picture of poor cash
management practices and a bureaucratic nightmare. While
NAFC, through the creation of CEEPS and the issuance of the
new reconciliation procedures, has managed some accounting
improvements in this area, additional improvements are
necessary.
Allowing the write-offs of many items is a treatment
of the symptoms but net a cure of the illness. It is simply
a cost-beneficial action that serves to reduce the size of
the remaining task. Associated with this action is the risk
that past improprieties will go undiscovered and that new
improprieties might be encouraged, since they too may be
written-off and never discovered.
Perhaps the greatest gain from the NAFC effort was
their demonstration of interest in this area. The authors
believe that this is the key to controlling the situation.
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Managers throughout the NIF must take a greater interest in
this problem before lasting improvements can be achieved.
But they cannot do it without the support of the finance
activities.
Consideration should te given to centralizing the
entire cash reconciliation process at NAFC. This would
allow individual NIF activities to focus their efforts upon
areas better managed at the local level, such as cost reduc-
tion measures. However, until this is done it must be
recognized that the key to reducing this problem lies in
finding a way to motivate both the NIF activities and the
finance activities towards actively pursuing reconciliation
through its completicr.
Heightened NIF management attention will produce an
increased reconciliation effort on the activity side but NIF
activities need strong support from the finance centers.
However, since the finance activities incur no costs as a
result of their slow cr incorrect responses to NIF requests,
there is an insufficient motivation for them to improve.
NAVCOMPT must find a iiethod to motivate the finance centers
to make them more responsive to NIF needs.
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1. CCHTBOL OF OPEBAIIBG COSTS
1 . Suaaar y
The IIF's operating costs are a direct result of
manageaeot decisions and policies established at each
echelon of governaect involved with the HIF froa Congress
down to the individual activity. The extent to which these
costs are controlled lapacts directly on the fund's cash
position. The study identified and explored several aspects
of operating costs which offer real potential for substan-
tial cash savings to the NIF.
What are the KIF's "operating costs"? The authors
will use this term to encompass those costs incurred in
conducting the ordinary major activities of each NIF
activity. Although the costs examined are identical to the
costs commonly referred to as production costs (direct
material, direct later and factory overhead) in most busi-
ness firms, the authors prefer the term operating costs in
view of the NIF's dual commercial and service orientation.
2- Direct Material
By definition direct material is any material or
part that can be physically identified with a product unit.
For a commercial activity such as a Naval Shipyard examples
of direct material for a ship's overhaul include steel and
aluminum, or parts such as boiler tubes, pump wearing rings,
high pressure piping, electronic components, radio receivers
and missile launchers to list but a few.
Direct material is routinely procurred well in
advance of its actual use in production. Depending upon the
"uniqueness" of direct material in regards to its applica-
tion, NIF activities stock and position direct material
differently.
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For example, the NARFs, which closely resemhle a
process system in many respects, commonly maintain a minimum
quantity of many materials and parts on hand so that produc-
tion is not halted for lack of material. Shipyards, on the
other hand more closely parallel a job shop system. Much of
the shipyard's direct material is unique to a specific ship
class or even a particulcir hull. As such, the shipyards
commonly only procure and position direct material for a
specific overhaul.
a. Material levels
A review of the financial and operating state-
jnents of several NIF activities and the briefings received
by the authors at two specific activities supports that the
direct material inventory (DMI) is extensive and its price
costly. In the shipyard environment, direct material
accounts for nearly one quarter of the activity's direct
costs. Commonly more than $.20 of every $1.00 of cost are
tied up in direct material. With such a sizeable investment
associated with DMI cne would expect the management of this
inventory to be optimized at all levels within the NIF with
particular emphasis at the activity level.
However, the authoi^s found that this is not
necessarily the practice. In fact, within the shipyard
community the policy exists whereby DMI management is
consciously sub-optinized. NAVSEA, as the responsible
management agency for Naval Shipyards, has established a
goal of having 100 percent DMI prepositioned at the shipyard
prior to the commencement of a vessel's overhaul. This
policy guidance is currently addressed in NAVSEA Instruction
4700. 8A of June 1982. Proponents of this policy verbalize
two central themes.
First, they rationalize the policy by high-
lighting the historic inabilities of their supply sources.
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Navy Stock Fund and commercial alike, to deliver on time.
They argue that despite the existing NAVSEA DM I goal, and
the local level's procurement efforts, DMI actually on site
at overhaul start rarely exceeds 75 percent of the total
ordered for submarine overhauls and 60 percent for surface
ship overhauls. As such the overwhelming majority of those
individuals involved with this process at the activity level
are frustrated by the lack of supplier response. Ihey no
longer ^juestion the financial soundness of the NAVSEA policy
tut continue to obligate millions of dollars against DMI.
Second, these same individuals point out that
although the cost of direct material accounts for about
one-fourth of their direct variable costs, management atten-
tion is tetter focused on optimizing the predominant cost
element, labor. Since an activity cannot easily manage
changes to its workforce, management does not want to jeop-
ardize the use of this resource by having it idle at the
expense of material shortage. (Labor costs will be
addressed in a later section.)
Although both arguments are plausible and have
merit, each reflects a particular conservatism in its
approach to efficient management of a resource. Combined
they ignore a fundamental issue: the true cost of supporting
the existing DMI policy.
The authors observed elaborate planning and
control systems among the shipyards. Program Evaluation and
Review Technique (PEET) and the Critical Path Method (CPM)
are popular quantitative techniques used to plan, schedule
and control ship overhauls. The shipyard planning depart-
ment goes to great effort to schedule when specific overhaul
repair work is to start. Obviously, not every production
job in the overhaul package will, can, nor should start on
Day 1. Given the length of a ship's overhaul today (a
typical destroyer's overhaul routinely spans 11-12 months).
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many jobs may not even begin for several months. However,
the present approach to procuring DMI simply ignores this
planning effort and attempts tc have all direct material on
site at Day 1. Presently there is no attempt to coordinate
material procurement really required to support the produc-
tion effort. Rather the simpler, albeit less efficient,
mindset governs: order DMI as early as possible attempting
to minimize the risk cf late delivery.
«?hat alternatives exist for the NIF in control-
ling their DMI costs? At one end of the spectrum is the
option tc continue doing business as they presently are.
The current system closely parallels the private sector's
"just-in-case" inventory system which has received, and
continues to receive, serious re-evaluation by American
industry.
The underlying philosophy to material invento-
ries throughout the NIF and particularly at the shipyards
has classically been one to order DMI to a level so as to
eliminate the potential risX of a production delay. In some
areas this approach may be the only viable alternative for
NIF activities. Certain NAEF*s are forced to carry a high
level of some select DMI because the Navy Supply System
refuses to carry these items due to a lack of system-wide
use.
For example, material for the aging A-3
aircraft, reworked by NARF Alameda, falls into this
category. However, this approach clearly costs the NIF
money. At the other end of the spectrum is the option cf
the "just- in-time" approach to inventory management.
Clearly with the multitude of restrictions and limitations
facing public sector contracting and supply sourcing today,
the just-in-time philosophy does not appear to be feasible.
However, if one were to step back for a moment and
reconsider the objectives of DCD Directive 7410.4, the just
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in time approach, as radical as it may appear by today's
public sector standards, may be a serious consideraticn for
tomorrow's NIF. Numerous legal changes would, of course, be
necessary to exempt the NIF from today's supply sourcing
criteria. Given the nature of the NIF's business environ-
ment such changes warrant re-thinking.
Somewhere in the middle of inventory management
spectrum lies a more immediately realizable option. NIF
management could rather easily analyze the direct material
being presently utilized in terms of dollar costs. A
certain dollar threshold could be established. Those high-
cost items above the threshold would receive enhanced
management attention and be tied more closely to when the
material was actually required to support the production
effort. Those items below the specified threshold would
receive minimal attention and simply be procured at any
point iE the requisitioning envelope to ensure receipt.
Complementing this approach must also be a conscious consid-
eration of the particular lead times involved for specific
items and material. This alternative would unquestionably
necessitate additional management attention, but clearly
provides an achieveable means to reduce the NIF's material
costs.
b- Excess Material
Excess material first became a high visibility
item when the Air Force became involved in a situation of
selling off, or disposing of, valuable material which was in
excess of their immediate needs, only to subsequently buy
back that same material from a private vendor at a much
higher price. An evaluation conducted of the NIF revealed a
similai problem existed, particularly at the shipyards.
Here excess material is simply what the name implies,
material remaining unused after a vessel's overhaul has been
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completed. The authors believe that this problem is tied
hand-iD-hand with NflVSEA's approach to requisitioning DMI.
It is clearly an outgrowth of an unwritten philosophy of
buying material in quantities to guarantee that an activity
will never run short. There are many cases in which an
activity will order 3 or maybe even 4 of a particular item
although its planning estimates only project a real need for
1 such item.
What real incentive exists for the shipyards to
eliminate excess? In practice, really very little incentive
exists. After all, material procured for a particular over-
haul is tuilt into the stabilized rate charged the customer
and therefore viewed ty many as free of cost at the shipyard
level.
In an attempt to deal with this costly problem
NAVSEA has taken some specific steps. For example, although
OSD lifted a DOD-wide freeze on excessing material in late
1984, NAl/SEA has continued the excessing freeze at the ship-
yards. However, there have been several undesired effects
of continuing the freeze on excessing material. Ihe most
significant impact has occurred in the area of final billing
a customer once an overhaul has been completed.
Under current procedures shipyards are unable to
final bill a customer until all excess material is cleared
from a ship's financial records. Although NAVSEA has an
established standard in which its shipyards have 60 days
after ccipletion of an overhaul to accomplish final tilling,
the imposed freeze severely restricts an activity's ability
to meet this goal. In fact, final billing today routinely
takes a shipyard between 6 to 8 months to complete and even
then is only accomplished by manipulating the process.
Shipyards have found that the easiest way to clear a ship's
records of excess material, and therefore be able to final
bill, is simply to roll the excess material forward to the
record's of the next ship in the overhaul process.
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This delaj in a shipyard's ability to final bill
clearly impacts upon that activity's and the entire NIF's
cash position. The Puget Sound Naval Shipyard described the
extent of the problem in its Financial and Operating
Statement of 30 September 1984 as follows:
Because of the freeze^ we are unable to clear excess EMI
from ship's financial records and therefore unable to
final bill our customers. This inability results in a
poorer cash positicn since we cannot take fixed price
gains (currently about $10 million and growing with the
completion of each availability) until final billing
occurs. [Ref- 22]-
The problems of this entire area are compounded
by an interface dilemma with the Navy Supply System. Of the
standard material left over at the end of an overhaul, only
about 23 percent will be accepted by the supply system for
credit and subsequent re-issue. The remaining 75+ percent
will not be accepted for one of two primary reasons: either
the particular material item does not exceed a specific
dollar value threshold or there is an abundance of the item
currently in the supply system. Additionally, the supply
system refuses to accept any non-standard material, regard-
less of its value. Under the current freeze these materials
are unable to be sold and remain at the shipyards.
In November 1984 NAVSZA promulgated additional
guidance in its attempt to deal with the current problem.
Rhereas the new policy attempts to delineate specific reten-
tion requirements for categories of excess material (for
example 6 years for non-standard stock items) , NAVSEA's
guidance is misdirected. It attempts to deal with the
consequences of an ill-conceived procurement policy rather
than the real source of the problem. It focuses on the
holding costs of this material and totally ignores the
buying costs. Nowhere does the policy address the potential
for entering excess EMI into a common data base. Such a
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system could facilitate the sharing of information
concerning excess DMI by all appropriate activities (e.g.
shipyards, NARFs) and eliminate the costly procurement of
DMI by one activity which was already being held it an
excess status at another activity.
c. Customer Erepayments
One means available to the Naval Shipyards to
reduce their investment in DMI is to take advance payments
for DMI from their customers. This procedure enables each
activity to tie up less of its corpus and, in theory at
least, to operate with less working capital. The procedures
for taking advance DMI payments are straight forward and
uncami;licated.
Current guidance stipulates that an activity can
take these advance payments once two criteria are met. The
current fiscal year must coincide with the fiscal year of
the vessel's induction into overhaul and a custoner'
s
funding document must be in hand. Although the activity may
have procured DMI as much as several years in advance of the
actual overhaul start date, these two criteria must be
satisfied before advance payments can be taken. It must be
emphasized, however, that the onus for taking advance
payments clearly rests with the activity. It is through
their iritiative that funds are drawn against a customer's
C&M,N account.
Table X7 depicts the status of DMI for each
Kaval Shipyard (NSY) as of 28 February 1985. As can be
observed the extent to which each of the eight shipyards
takes advantage of the DMI advance payment opportunity
varies drastically. One would almost be lead to believe
that nc standard guidance exists in this area. However, it
is NAVCOMPT's and NAVSEA's goal that customer prepayments be
90 percent of that EMI identified with and assigned to a
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particular job order. Although this goal may be a tit
overly aggressive, it does exist and it certainly captures
the appropriate concept of usicg working capital.
TABLE XI
Shipyard CHI and Custoaer Prepayments









Norfolk Ma, 386 27
Charleston 23,493
Long Eeach 22,960 9,209
Mare Island 29,188 13,944
Puget Sound 55,645 36,643
Pearl Harbor 28,174 7,628











Clearly none of the shipyards are achieving this
goal and the ranee among shipyards is large. NSY
Philadelphia comes closest to the goal at 76 percent while
NSY Charleston takes no advantage of advance DMI payments.
More significant, however, the performance in terms of




Taking advance DMI payments from customers is an
area that the authors believe warrants immediate management
attention at the NAVSEA level. The potential for cash
savings here are real and there for the taking. Clearly
improvements in this area will not come cost-free to an
activity. However, since seven of the eight shipyards
already have a system in place, minimal changes to policy
and manning would he projected for these activities. NSY
Charleston must implement a system to support the Activity
Group Ccmmander's policy.
In summary it should be clear that the authors
believe that improvements can be made in the entire DMI
area. However, this will require a completely revised
approach to inventory management at both the Activity Group
and activity levels. The entire inventory issue must be
managed from "cradle to grave" rather than under today's
patch work methodclogy. More efficient methods of
predicting material requirements are urgently needed so that
huge excesses are not left over. Improved procedures must be
developed to identify what is actually already on hand so as
to eliminate unnecessary and costly duplicate requisi-
tioning. A system must be established which facilitates the
sharing of material availability information among the ship-
yards. In short, shipyard management must stop avoiding its
management responsibility by having so much material on hand
that there is no need to manage its inventories.
d. Material-in-Transit
Still another material area offering the poten-
tial for improvement in the NIF's cash position is material-
in-transit (MIT). Here the opportunity results frcm a
different management approach in the payment of requisi-
tioned material depending upon source. Payment for material
procured from private vendors is not effected urtil the
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material is actually received. On the other hand, however,
for material requisitioned from any government source (the
vast majority of the NIF's material comes from the Navy
Stock Fund) the furds are obligated in advance of the
receipt of the material. In fact, material procured from
any government source is charged against the shipyard's
records once the material is dropped from the source's
records. Herein lies problem.
The authors reviewed the Financial and Operating
Statements for the eighteen month period of 30 June 1983 to
31 December 1934 of three different shipyards and found that
on the average 33 percent of the material-in-transit was
over 6 months old. For example, as of 30 September 1S84
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard's (PHNSY) financial statement
reflected $1.4 million of its total MIT of $3.4 million over
180 days old. Due tc the formatting of these statements the
authors were unable to further analyze the aging of MIT
older than 6 months. However, an audit conducted at PHNSY
by the Naval Audit Service in FY 1981 documented that about
40 percent of that activity's MIT was over 18 months old.
[Ref. 23] Each shipyard not only has substantial amounts of
money tied up for lengthy periods in its material- in-transit
account, but is also subject to charges for material that
occasionally is never received.
Aligning the existing policy for material
procured from government sources with those procedures
currently in effect for material supplied by private vendors
will improve the NIF's cash position. Although saaller
dollar inprovement potential exists in MIT as compared to
the previously discussed material areas, the potential for
improvement exists ncnetheless-
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3 . Direct Labor
lator comprises the most significant portion cf the
cost of goods and services produced by NIF activities. As
previously noted labor represents more than 70 percent of
the cost of services provided by the shipyards. This situ-
ation is exacerbated ty the fact that the NIF's labor costs
have increased by 6 percent as compared to an increase of
UO percent in the private sector's labor costs over the past
5 year period. Controlling the cost of labor clearly
warrants NIF's management's attention.
A review of the Personnel Summary Sections for each
Industrial Fund of the President's Budgets for the period
1955 to 1985 revealed several interesting points in regards
to labor. Up until FY 1973 the average grade level of a
General Schedule (GS) employee within the NIF closely
approximated the highest average GS grade level of any of
the other four Federal Government industrial funds.
Beginning in FY 1974 a trend began. While the average GS
grade level within each of the other four industrial funds
remained plateaued, the average GS grade within the NIF has
steadily risen. In FY 1982, for example, the NIF's average
GS grade level was 9.17, almost one full grade higher than
any of the other industrial funds. Figure 6.2 shows the
NIF's average GS grade for each fiscal year from 1955
through 1982. Figure 6.3 shows the trend in the average
number employees at NIF activities and figure 6.4 shows the
average annual salary for GS and ungraded positions for each
fiscal year from 1956 through 1984.
To what extent can NIF managers control their labor
costs? Many have traditionally argued that little can be
done to control these costs- However, this argument or.ly
addresses one side of an activity's labor costs. The cost
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As discussed in Section B of this chapter, NIF
managers have virtually no control over the wage rate
element. Additionally, NIF activities are subject to
civilian employee ceilings and constraints on hiring and
firing as are other government activities. Although
patterned after private sector businesses, NIF management is
unable to cjuickly reduce or increase its labor force as a
function of workload- When the workload drops off, excess
labor is, at best 'farmed out' to other NIF activities where
work exists, but more commonly is carried in factory over-
head. Should unexpected work develop, the personnel ceil-
ings frequently prevent managers from hiring people
permanently to do the work. Rather management faces limited
options. The work, if accepted, can be performed by hiring
temporary or part-time workers, if available, using expen-
sive overtime, or be contracted out. Each of these substi-
tute sources of labor are also subject to various
constraints.
NIF management does have control over the second
component of labor ccsts, namely wage hours. The establish-
ment and application cf production standards and the control
of an activity's productivity is certainly the responsi-
bility of its management. These aspects of NIF management
are discussed in Section F of this chapter.
a. Temporary Workers
The utilization of temporary workers provides
certain NIF activities limited flexibility in altering their
manning profile and reducing labor costs. However, an
activity's location and the nature of the work it performs
impacts upon the extent to which 'temporaries' can be bene-
ficially employed. For example, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
(PSNSY), the second largest shipyard in regards to the size
of its labor force and primarily a nuclear overhaul
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facility, requires specially skilled workers but faces an
extremely small labor pool. As such PSNSY's 'temporaries'
comprise only 5 percent (600 workers) of the work force.
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, on the other hand, faces a
differ€nt environment. It is not only a conventional ship-
yard tut its geographical location provides access to a
substantially larger labor pool. As such, Philadelphia
routinely employs 150C temporary workers.
b. Overtime
The authors' research revealed that minimal
management control of overtime exists for some NIF activi-
ties, particularly the shipyards and the NARFs. For
example, the shipyards have traditionally received the
entire aiiount of overtime requested, free from budget cuts
at the Activity Group level. However, even this financially
questionable management approach has not proved satisfacto-
rily controllable. iJhereas direct overtime within the ship-
yards has historically averaged approxiicately 10 percent per
year, first quarter FY 1985 direct labor overtime increased
to an Activity-Group wide average of nearly 19 percent.
Figures 6-5, 6.6 ard 6.7 depict the quarterly trends in
overtime beginning 30 September 1983 for the shipyards,
NARFs and total NIF respectively. These figures clearly
highlight the fact that this area warrants renewed manage-
ment attention if later costs are to be controlled.
c- Summary
Employment ceilings and restrictive termination
policies used by the President and Congress to maintain
control of the total number of Federal employees are at best
inferior substitutes for financial controls and effective
management. However, as long as these controls are utilized
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within the system tc do a tetter job controlling labor
costs. Unquestionably NIF management is constrained in this
area, but improvements are readily achieveable. Figures 6.3
and 6.7 clearly indicate that potential cost savings exist,
lotal NIF nanning levels must be re-evaluated with the goal
to improve productivity and reduce excesses. Direct over-
time must also be reduced. Reductions in both of these
areas simultaneously will, of course, create a real chal-
lenge for NIF managers to continue to provide service or
deliver a quality product on schedule.
4 . Overhead
Overhead costs are those costs of business associ-
ated with the general operation and administration of indi-
vidual NIF activities. The authors believe that an
opportunity exists for many NIF activities to significantly
reduce their overhead costs, and that this can be acccm-
plished by management action at either the individual
activity. Activity Group, or NAVCOMPT level.
When intervie^ied by the authors NAVCOMPT, as the
overall NIF manager, estimated that some NIF activities may
have as much as 25 percent excessive personnel working in
areas charged to overhead. To combat this, NAVCOMPT
severely marks (adjusts) these budgets, lowering, for
example, a proposed stabilized rate. Some activities
respond properly by squeezing overhead in order to remain
within budget, while others fail and reluctantly accept the
financial loss.
One means cf monitoring NIF overhead costs is
through the productivity ratio, computed by dividing direct
labor time by total labor time. The lower an activity's
overhead percentage is, the higher their pr^-^ iuctivity ratio.
Table XVI displays productivity ration for the Naval
Shipyards for fiscal years 1978 and 1984 ana the end of the




ACTIVITY FY 78 FY 84 £1 FY 8 5
PDGET SOUND .59 .57 .60
PHILADELPHIA .62 .58 .58
LONG BEACH .63 .55 .57
PEARL HARBOE .62 .54 .55
PORTSMOUTH .57 .51 .55
CHARLESTON .57 .55 .54
MARE ISLAND .60 .54 .55
NORFOLK .58 .54 .54
Source; NAVCOMPT Autodin Report
As seen in Tatle XVI, during the period from FY 1978
to FY 1984 every shipyard saw a decrease in productivity.
In fact, two shipyards saw their productivity ratios plummet
8 percent. Claims were made that overhead growth was due to
new requirements such as tighter security and better commu-
nications facilities. Others claimed workload reductions
had left the activities with greater fixed costs to
distribute over fewer total labor time.
Yet some activities have recently improved their
productivity ratios. NARF Alameda reduced their overhead
workforce by 56 persons during FY 1984, contributing tc a 3
percent rise in their productivity ratio. This significant
accomplishment re^^uired close management attention to the
problem and was accomplished through the elimination of seme
unnecessary jobs and the removal of non-performing
personnel.
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Euget Sound Naval Shipyard increased their prcduc-
tivity ratio 3 percent during the first quarter of FY 1985-
During their visit, the authors noted a concern for cutting
overhead costs which was shared by all levels of management.
Ihe result speaks for itself.
Management attention and efforts in the area of
overhead costs offer the activities of the NIF a very real
opportunity to lower costs. The authors believe that imme-
diate action should be taken at all levels of NIF management
in order to bring this problem under control.
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F. ESTABIISHIHG ABD APPLYING PBOffiDCTION STANDARDS
1 . Suaaar y
Frodaction standards, in one form or another, are a
part of nearly every type of HIF activity. Variations
exist, however, in the application of these standards. For
example, production (labor) standards are a key conponent in
the pricing eguaticns only at the Naval Air Rework
Facilities and the Navy Publications and Printing Service-
The authors believe that the process of setting production
standards at these activities could significantly iapact
upon their cash positions.
2 • Tihat a re Production Standards?
A production standard is the ^^redetermined amount of
work that should be performed during a specific period of
time. It may also t€ described as a benchmark of how effi-
ciently resources should ke converted into gocds or
services. A variation of the production standard is the
standard time, or work norm, which is defined as the amount
of time it should take to complete a specific task.
Production standards exist to support managenient.
Management can measure productivity and then compare these
actual results against the previously determined norm.
Effective use of these measurements contributes to achieving
an efficient operaticn. Specifically, production standards
are used in cost reduction programs, product pricing deci-
sions, production scheduling, and the measurement of worker
performance.
3- Setting the Standar d
Setting a standard for labor performance is ty no
means a simple task. It often involves careful studies and
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time consuming disputes and negotiations, particularly in
unionized workplaces.
A wide range cf techniques are employed when setting
these standards, ranging from a simple judgement based upon
past experience to the use of computerized models. the
primary method, however, involves scientifically reducing
each task down to a series of human movements, statistically
calculating an average time value for each of these motions,
summing these time values to arrive at the re^^uired time to
complete a specific task, and adjusting this total in order
to allow for other considerations.
Ihe first step in establishing a standard employs
scientific time and motion studies, usually accomplished by
industrial engineers. These studies are broken down into
the task of identifying the individual movements necessary
to complete a task and the recording of time measurements of
these individual human movements. Each movement is given a
time value based upon numerous observations of various
people performing these movements. Analysis of these meas-
urements is then acccaplished, usually using one of several
well-regarded scientific methods.
Ihe time values assigned to the series of movements
required to complete a task are then summed in order to
arrive at the total time required to perform a specific
task. The totals are then adjusted to allow for start-up
times, machine breakdowns, waiting, rest periods, and so on.
These adjustments typically involve inputs from engineers,
accountants, management, and labor representatives and may
require delicate negotiations. The final result is the
standard time for a particular job, or the "work norm" for
that jot.
When a new product or process is started, the labor
standard must also include a provision for learning. Each
time a repetitive task is performed a worker "learns" how to
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complete this reguirement in less time. The rate that this
learning takes place is dependent upon many variables, tut
can he adequately estimated for various particular types of
work. A mathematical model is then used to express this
rate of learning, which can then be described as a percent
learning curve. For example, a 70 percent learning curve
means that, theoretically, every time the number of repeti-
tions is doubled, the time required to perform the task
should be only 70 percent of the time previously necessary.
^ • HZ Applications of Product Standards
Throughout the Navy Industrial Fund production stan-
dards are used to assist management in planning and control,
much as in the private sector. In fact, often NIF manage-
ment is able to compare its standards to those established
in a similar industry outside of Government. Additionally,
the NIF employs work rorms in the determination of prices at
both the NAHFs and Printing Service. At these activities,
high volume repetitive work facilitates the use of the unit-
price concept. This, in turn, permits the use of fixed-
price contracts without negotiations. The customer is
simply charged an amount equal to the product of the current
stabilized rate and the work norm for a particular job.
5- Establishi ng Work Norms at the NARIs
Work norms are established for the individual jobs
performed at the NARFs using an analysis by industrial engi-
neers as a basis. The Naval Aviation Logistics Center
(NAIC) then adjusts these measurements to a level which they
believe is attainable. NALC adjustments encompass both
general allowances such as employee rest periods as well as
specific considerations such as variations in plant layouts
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tetween the NAEF activities. Although the NARF activities
are unionized, labor organizations have no voice in the
setting of these norms. Additionally NAVCOMPT, as the NIF
aanager, reviews these developed norms quarterly and has the
final approval of all modifications.
6. Impact Upon Cash Position
It is apparent that the Navy, through the Office of
the Comptroller, is using work norms as one component of a
NIF price control plan. The other key component in this
strategy is the stabilized rate.
Stabilized rates, addressed in a separate section of
this chapter^ are (theoretically) designed to capture all
costs of an activity and reduce these costs to a unit price.
At the NARFs, stabilized rates are a price per direct labor
man-hour. These rates are established as part of the NIF
budget.
TAoTk norms, cr the other hand, are not a part of the
budget. This fact allows NAVCOMPT a great deal of latitude
in adjusting prices charged to NAEF customers. For exairple,
when developing the work norms to be used by the NAF.Fs
during FY 1583, NAVCCBPT directed NALC to use the same norms
that were established during the third quarter of FY 1981,
halting the trend of escalating standards. The effects of
this action were far reaching. The Naval Audit Service, in
their report on NAEF cash position management, referred to
this action and commented:
Frozen workload standards prevent annual renegotiation
that will allow for such factors as the increased age of
aircraft. actual rework experience, and major
modifications [Ref. 22].
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NALC calculated that MAVCOMPT»s decision to freeze
norms resulted in a 325.9 million loss for the NAEFs in FY
1983. Why would NA7C0MPT take such an action? Two possi-
bilities exist.
The first possible explanation for NAVCOMPT's delib-
erate action is that it was a calculated effort intended to
bring down prices by forcing the NARFs into greater effi-
ciency. Indeed, this was the explanation identified in the
Naval Audit Service report. NAVCOMPT representatives, when
interviewed by the authors, substantiated this cpinicn.
They claimed that their actions forced NABF management to
closely monitor the content of work packages and eliminate
unnecessary tasks. This, in turn, reduced costs and
increased efficiencies. NAVCOMPT estimated that these cost
reductions saved nearly $13 million in FY 1983. The theory
that these cost reductions were due solely to improved effi-
ciencies, however, is uncertain.
But what actions were necessary to cut costs? NARF
cash management seemed beyond the control of the activity
commander. Frustrations set in and extraordinary cost-
cutting measures tock place. Besides reductions in the
scope of normal work packages other actions, such as
training reductions and maintenance cut-backs became
commonplace.
A second possibility for NAVCOMPT*s action also
provides an answer to the question to why NAVCOMPT delayed
so long in taking any action, even when presented figures
showing huge NARF losses. Frozen work norms resulted in
prices charged to NARF customers which were insufficient to
cover production costs. In other words, customers got mere
work done than they paid for. Obviously, the customer
benefited greatly from the decision to freeze work ncrms.
Could this have been intentional?
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The Naval Audit Service, in their audit of FY 1S83
NARF operations, stated that there was a shortage of
customer funds necessary to fully reimburse the Navy
Industrial Fund. In other words, the customer could not
afford to pay a price which covered all NIF costs.
7 4 Conclusions
For proper cost planning and control, establishing
and modifying work norms must be removed from political
considerations. NIF line managers must be allowed to make
these decisions, and a careful analysis of production cost
trends and variances must be a part of this decision
process. Is the learning curve accurate? Are costs
increasing? If so, why? What part of cost increases are
uncontrollable, such as resulting from aging aircraft?
Answering these questions and others is part of a sound
norm-setting process. Work norms need to be reasonable
figures which are not subjected to arbitrary, unccntrclled
adjustments. NAVCOMFT can continue to promote increased
efficiency by other means such as establishing incentives




G. IHCEHTIVES FOR IHrSOTIIG CASH MANAGEMENT
1 • Suaaary
Perforaance incentives are a vital component of
every successful management control system. Presently, the
Navy Industrial Fund has few positive managerial incentives,
thereby impeding the improvement of the effectiveness of NIF
cash management. The authors believe that opportunities
exist for HIF managers to be further incentivized towards
actions uhich improve cash management while still providing
the easterner a quality product on schedule. These incen-
tives include rewards both in the form of positive perfora-
ance evaluations (military and civilian aliXe) and merit pay
for civilians, and negative motivaters including the
restructuring of Title 31, O.S. Code, sections 1341 and 1517
(formerly E.S. 3679) to encompass joint responsibility at
both HAVCOMPT and the activity group levels.
2 . The Present Iccenti ve System
Incentives are a well established method of moti-
vating individuals towards channeling and sustaining their
efforts in a particular, desired direction. The authors
believe that within the NIF, managers are insufficiently
motivated in the area of cash management. For example,
presently few performance evaluations require a comment on a
manager's financial management performance. Only the NAVAIR
Systems Command's evaluations of subordinate commanding
officers (at NALC and NARFs) contain a recently added item
on cash management.
NAVAIR, in the wake cf the NARF's huge financial
losses, has developed 14 key financial indicators which it
uses to carefully monitor NAEF performance. Several of
these indicators are also used in the evaluation of the six
NARF Ccmmanding Officers, as well as in the evaluation of
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the NALC Commanding Officer, the intermediary between NAVAIE
and the NABFs.
The five financial performance indicators used in a






Targets are established for each of these items unique for
an individual NARF activity. Actual performance can then be
compared against the stated objective and, using a weighted
scoring system, an evaluatioD of the commanding officer's
financial management performance made.
NAVAIR has taken other significant steps towards
making NASF managers more attentive to cash management. The
tours of NARF Commanding Officers have been lengthened from
two years to three years. Additionally, whenever a 10
percent variance occurs in any of 14 key financial indica-
tors (reported monthly) the NARF management must provide an
explanation to NAVAIE, via the chain-of-command. The indi-









Allocated direct labor hours
Indirect labor hours
Direct labor overtime hours
Indirect labor overtime hours
Total permanent employees
Total temporary enifloyees
Unfortunately, other commands have not followed
NAVAIR's example. Other activity managers, in general,
receive no rewards or penalties as a consequence of how they
influence cash flow.
The primary incentive for effective overall NIF cash
management is Title 21, a.S. Code, sections 1341 and 1517
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which place limitaticES on the amount of funds which may be
expended and obligated. For the Navy Industrial Fund this
law requires that the cash balance at the Treasury
Department always be non-negative- The responsibility for
ensuring NIF compliance with the provisions of this law
rests with the Office of the Comptroller, NAVCCMET. No
other ccmmand within NIF shares any of this responsibility.
3 . Eec omm ended Incentives
a. The Need For Cash Management Incentives
Fhile it is certainly not the case that the NIF
lacks management talent, it certainly is true that managers
manage what they perceive to be important. With the respon-
sibility for adhering to the specifications of Title 31
resting solely upon the shoulders of NAVCOMPT and without
any budgetary responsibility for the cost of money, activity
managers cannot be tlamed for the failure to give cash
management serious attention. They must be incentivized
towards actions of effective cash management.
But these incentives are lacking. The 1976
Joint Financial Management Improvement Program reported;
The study has confirmed the previous assumptions
concerning the importance of cash management in the
Federal Government and the general lack of attention by
operating agencies to specific plans and procedures *itn
respect xo cash management. This is not considered to
be due to mismanageaent but to a lack of motivation for
agencies to manage cash effectively.
This theory was supported in the 1S78
President's Reorganization Project Report, which stated:
There has been little incentive in the Federal
Government for program and financial managers to prac-
tice cash management. Managers, in general, received no
rewards or penalties as a conseguence of the way they
manage collections and disbursements. With few
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exceptions. agencies and departments experience no
direct costs or benefit related to the cash flow they
handle. The absence of incentives for managers has
tended to result in lack of attention to managing cash
flows, including a low priority for developing modern
cash management systems, practices and techniques.
t- Title 31, a.S. Code
The authors recommend that the responsibility
for avoiding a violation of Title 3 1 be refocused. Activity
Group Commanders should share in the responsibility for
keeping the NIF Treasury cash account non-negative. This
can he accomplished by holding NAVCOMPT and an Activity
Group Commander jointly accountable for maintaining the
Activity Group's share of the Treasury cash account non-
negative. In this way each and every Activity Group would
have to remain in a sound cash position, unlike the present
system which requires only the sum total of all Activity
Groups to be solvent.
Lowering the level for Title 31 responsibility
must be done carefully. An Activity Group Commander should
not be held solely accountable for that Activity Group's
performance. NAVCOMPT retains such a great deal of power
that the Activity Group Commander cannot control all aspects
of performance. For example, the setting of stabilized
rates and the establishment of work norms are a part of a
budgetary process and thus subject to NAVCOMPT marks. These
adjustments can significantly impact upon an Activity
Group's Treasury cash position.
c. Performance Evaluations
If the responsibility under Title 31 is refo-
cused as recommended, both NAVCOMPT and Activity Group
Commanders will be incentivized towards sound cash
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management practices. But what about the individual activi-
ty's ccmmanding officer and key civilian personnel? Ihe
authors support the actions taken by NAVAIR which require
NARF ccmmanding officer fitness reports to contain an evalu-
ation of cash management effectiveness. It is recommended
that other activities follow this example and provide
specific, measurable financial objectives for activity
commanders to work towards.
d. Financial Management By Objectives
NAVAIR is attacking the NABF cash problem using
a management by objectives approach. The entire NIF should
adopt this process, beginning with NIF top management
setting overall financial goals. These goals should be
carefully designed in order tc motivate NIF cash managers
towards minimizing the cash held outside the Treasury
Department. In this way the NIF can do its share in mini-
mizing the Federal Gcvernment's cost of money. The goals,
once announced, would serve as the beginning point for the
Activity Group Commanders to establish their own objectives
and plans for achieving the stated goals.
Activity Group objectives and plans must
consider the costs of implementation. For example, suppose
NAVCOHPI decided that excessive inventory levels were
costing the Federal Government by unnecessarily keeping
funds outside of the Treasury Department account. Rather
than developing a costly, bureaucratic program that charges
each NIF activity interest on the dollar value cf their
inventory, a simple objective such as "a 10 percent reduc-
tion in inventory level by the end of the year" could accom-
plish this same goal.
The Activity Group should then provide the indi-
vidual NIF activities specific, measurable objectives.
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These objectives should be limited to performance areas that
are under the control of the individual to be held accoun-
table. This is a key point. Activity Groups which use
stabilized rates or work norms must allow the individual
activity to participate in the establishment of these rates.
During visits to two individual NIF activities
the authors found contrasting opinions on the degree to
which an individual activity participates in the establish-
ment of these rates. One activity found little change
between rates that they proposed and those incorporated into
the budget. An activity in a different Activity Group
called the process cf negotiating these rates a waste of
time as their inputs were completely ignored and they were





Civilian government employees are eligible for
types cf positive incentives net available to the military.
The authors recommend that the NIF take advantage of these
motivational opportunities by developinj a NIF- wide program
to insure cash management initiatives are included as a
critical element of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and
Merit Pay programs. The SES is a separate personnel system
for top level government employees and appraises their
performance through a comparison of actual performance
against agreed upon objectives. The Jerit Pay System allows
an agency to develop a system that pays more to better
performing supervisors and managers. Both of these systems
offer the NIF an opportunity to incentivize civilian
managers towards more effective cash management actions.
Additionally, other incentive programs such as
suggestion awards, ccmmendations, and other special recogni-
tions can be used to generate cash management improvement
ideas.
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f. Impact Open Production Performance
Throughout this discussion the authors have
identified numerous opportunities for the NIF to motivate
their managers towards actions which would improve NIF's
cash management. But what effect would these incentives
have upon an activity's production performance? The authors
helieve that many cash managenent improvements can be made
without impacting upon NIF's ability to deliver a quality
product en schedule.
The design of any incentive program must tegin
with the understanding that the activities of the Nil are
service oriented and consider meeting their delivery
schedule to be critical. The needs of the Navy, and hence
the reputations of individual activities and their managers
hinge upon the timely delivery of their products. What is
the cost of a late delivery? At each level within the NIF
chain-of-command, from NAVCCMPT through the individual
activity, the authors asked if the cost of a one day or a
one week delay in the completion of a ship overhaul had ever
teen estimated. T7ithout exception, the response was no.
Slipping the completion date of an overhaul is not consid-
ered to te an option for cost savings. The perturbations on
Navy scheduling are too costly. Operating under this
constraint, the authors still consider the previously
discussed incentives as a valid means of bringing about
improved cash management.
g. Conclusion
In conclusion, the authors believe that the
strong competition that exists between the individual
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activities within a NIF Activity Group will coiitinu€ to
provide sufficient motivation to deliver a quality product
on time. However, this healthy, competitive atmosphere
should fce expanded tc encompass cash management competition
as well. NIF activity managers must believe that effective
cash management is beneficial to them personally, and also
beneficial to their NIF activity. Incentives, such as those
identified by the authors, can provide the necessary motiva-
tional force needed to bring about these cash management
improvements.
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B. COHTBACT DESIGN OrPOETDHITIES
1 . SuBaarj
Contracts serve as a legal means for contractors and
their custoaers to agiee upon a method of payment for goods
or services to be provided. The Navy Industrial Fund activ-
ities enter into agreements to perform work for their
customers using various contracting methods. The authors
believe that the selection of a particular type of
contracting method directly effects the price charged for
this work and thus impacts upon the cash position of the
individual HIF activity and the entire HIF.
2. Nir Contract 3i£es
The Activity Groups of the Navy Industrial Fund
employ different ap^Jioaches in charging their customers for
goods or services provided. Basically, these contracting




Although different in their approaches, all three categories
share the common Ioeo term goal of recovering all incurred
costs.
The cost reimbursable contract re^juires that the
customer pay for all allowable contract costs. Due tc the
uncertainty of the final price, this method is primarily
used only in the absence of any valid basis for making a
reasonable estimate cf total performance costs. Cost reim-
bursement provides a means of shifting certain indefinite
risks from the NIF to their customer and thus allows fcr the
work to guickly begir even though a final cost cannot be
determined. Unfortunately, these contracts offer little or
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no incentive for effective cost control. Additionally, the
cost reimbursable contract imposes an administrative burden
upon both the NIF and their customer, rec^uiring careful
surveillance and auditing of costs. For these reasons, and
since the development of the stabilized rate concept
(addressed in a separate section of this chapter) this
approach has fallen into very limited use.
Ihe second method, the predetermined rate approach,
charges customers a preset "stabilized rate", designed to
recover costs considered to be predictable. A dditiorally
,
these costs are expressed as a function of another, more
easily measured cost item such as direct labor man hours.
Billable costs are then easily accumulated for each customer
account. The selection of the predetermined rate value
requires careful consideration of all cost trends to ensure
they are captured within the rate charged. In this way the
objective of zero accumulated operating results (ACB) can
still be achieved. This method provides some incentive for
the NIF activity to control costs, but does not provide a
ceiling on total price. While this allows the scope of a
work package to be expanded to cover new work, it also
permits billing for both effectively and ineffectively
performed work.
A third NIF contracting approach is the fixed price
contract. Here, the work order involves an agreement
betweec an individual NIF activity and its customer to
perform a specific work package at a specified price. This
fixed price may be either negotiated or determined mathemat-
ically using the product of work norms and applicable stabi-
lized rates. The NIF activity must then perform the agreed
upon work for this price regardless of the actual ccst
experienced. This method offers the greatest incentive for
the NIF activity to control operating costs and it requires
the least administrative burden of the three methods
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discussed. It also places all financial risk and responsi-
bility for performance on tlie NIP activity.
The NIF primarily uses the fixed price contracting
method, although predetermined rates are also used in
contracting with their customers. The use of these methods
permits the possibility that the individual NIF activity
could earn a profit or suffer a loss based upon their
ability to control production costs. The selection of
either of these methods over the cost reimbursement approach
makes it appear that the objective of zero AOR is a long
range goal, not necessarily to be achieved on each and every
contract. Additionally, the goal of zero AOR does not
necessarily override the desire to encourage efficiency at
the NIF activities.
3 • Contracts at Selected Activity Groups
The effect that the selection of a particular type
of contract has upon NIF performance can be discussed by
examining the three largest NIF Activity Groups and their
contracting methods. The Naval Air Rework Facilities, the
Military Sealift Command, and the Naval Shipyards use either
fixed price contracts, predetermined rates, or a variation
of these twc approaches.
Due to the production-line nature of aircraft main-
tenance work, NIF management has decided that the NAEFs
should use firm-fixed price contracts for nearly all of
their work. The fixed price, however, is not negotiated but
rather calculated using work norms (predetermined amount of
labor for a particular task) and stabilized rates estab-
lished 18 to 24 months earlier. While the use of a firm
fixed price contract may promote cost consciousness and
encourage efficiency, the procedure for setting the rates
often has prevented the NARFs from achieving a zero AOE,
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most notably during FY 1983. In fact, the Naval Audit
Service report on lY 1983 NAEF cash position management
stated that of the $154.6 million loss suffered by the NARFs
during that year, $67.1 million was due to inadequate stabi-
lized rates and $25.9 million due to underestimated work
norms.
The Military Sealift Command primarily uses negoti-
ated fixed price contracts with an economic price adjustment
clause. This clause allows for reimbursements for esca-
lating costs in areas such as the price of fuel, and thus
shifts a portion of the financial risk away from MSC and
towards their customers.
Naval Shipyards use a hybrid of the firm-fixed price
and predetermined rate type contracts. Typically, the
customer is charged the product of a stabilized rate (price
per manday) and the level of effort (number of mandays
worked) through the first half of a ship overhaul. At this
point, the scope of the remaining work and a firm-fixed
price are agreed upon. This arrangement has allowed growth
work during the portion of the overhaul when equipment is
removed and opened and then set the final price when, opti-
mistically, the sco^e of the remaining work package can be
determined.
4 . flcccapli shme nts and Opportunities
While the use of predetermined rates and fixed price
contracts has made achieving the zero AOR objective more
difficult, it has probably achieved the reduction of produc-
tion costs and thus promoted efficiency. Contracts which
are not simply cost reimbursements provide a strong
incentive to avoid waste and devise production and subcon-
tracting methods that save labor and naterials.
Furthermore, these contracts are the simplest to administer
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by boti the NIF activity and the customer- Care must be
exercised^ however, so that the NIF activity is not also
motivated towards taking undesirable shortcuts in their
attempt to meet budgetary requirements. Inspections, tests,
warranties, and ether guality assurance measures should be a
part of the contract in order to provide the necessary
controls to avoid this occurrence.
NIF management has apparently determined that the
advantages of using variations of the fixed price contract
outweigh their disadvantages. In fact, consideration is
being given to the idea of changing all ship overhaul
contracts so that the final, firm-fixed price is established
at the start date, rather than fixing this price at the
overhaul's halfway point. The NIF customer believes that
this change would hold down overhaul costs and increase the
probability that the overhaul could be completed en time.
The NIF activity also supports this move, believing that
their experience is sufficient enough to adequately predict
the scope of an upcoming repair package and the cost of
completing this work. This knowledge would place them in a
strong bargaining position.
Interestingly, the shipyard also believes that they
will not be accepting a significant amount of additional
financial risk. In order to understand this theory, an
appreciation for the shipyard's view of financial risk must
be gained. Figure 6.8 was developed by the Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard and depicts financial risk (the risk of
failing to complete a work package at a predicted cost) as a
function of the point during the overhaul that this final
cost prediction is made.
The broken lire in the figure represents a straight
line reduction in risk as the overhaul progresses. In ether
words, at the half way point in the overhaul there would be

























PERCENT OF OVEEHAOL COMPLETED
Pigure 6.8 FinaDcial Bisk vs Percent lork Completed-
predicted. The exferience of the shipyard, ho^iever,
expresses this time/risk relationship as a ncc-linear
function. They believe that a 50 percent chance of
predicting final overhaul cost is not achieved until 75
percent of the overhaul is completed. More significant is
their belief that at the halfway point in the overhaul, the
point where a firm-fixed price agreement is presently made,
they can do little better at predicting the final cost than
if this prediction were made at the overhaul start date.
5 . EeccmmendaticES
The authors support the use of fixed price contracts
by the major activity groups of thf Navy Industrial Fund.
Beguiring the NIF activity manager to complete the specified
I
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work vithiD the estahlished price should promote efficiency.
However, since these same managers are expected to achieve a
zero AOR, the setting of the fixed price must be done
fairly. The agreed upon price, while encouraging ccst
reductions, must alsc allow the NIF activity an opportunity
to breakeven. For some contracts, such as ship overhauls,
this requires a fair negotiation process, during which the
scope of all work is identified, prior to the setting of the
fixed price.
The authors further believe that establishing the
price and size of an overhaul work package at the outset
will provide a much-needed incentive for both the shipyard
and their customer to better identify the specific work
necessary to complete an overhaul- The present system of
using a pre-overhaul test and inspection (P0T5I) will have
to be greatly improved upon. In this way, both parties
would be better prepared to negotiate a fixed price.
When work norms and stabilized rates are used tc set
the fixed price, reasonable negotiations must have been a
part of setting these rates. If this is not the case, the
zero AOE objective may appear so far out of reach that
managers are not motivated towards striving for what they
perceive as an unobtainable goal.
In summary, contract design does offer an opportu-
nity for improved cash positions at the NIF activities. The
authors believe that aany NIF operations are ideally suited
for a profit-type motivation, which can best be brought
about through the use of variations of the fixed price
contract. These contracts will encourage the NIF activity
to take many necessary measures in order to bring about cost
reductions. This improved efficiency will not only result
in more work accomplished for each customer dollar, but also
offer the NIF activity an opportunity for short-run profits.
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?!!• CONCLHSIONS
During the course of their research the authors identi-
fied and analyzed numerous opportunities for the Navy
Industrial Fund to ccntrifcute towards the effort of mini-
mizing the Government's cost of money. The authors deter-
mined that the NIF iaproves the government's cash position
through actions which improve the position of the NIF
account at the Treasury Department. NIF refers to this
account as "Treasury cash."
The authors found that the NIF performance of the
existing Federal cash management programs is generally
satisfactory, and areas which offer the potential for
improvement were noted. The authors believe that efforts in
these areas would produce a negligible effect upon either
Treasury cash or the NIF activities* own cash records,
refered to as "activity cash."
The authors did, however, discover numerous opportuni-
ties, not included in specific Federal programs, which would
enable the NIF to better manage their cash. Additionally,
the authors have identified areas where they believe action
should be taken by NIF management in order to reduce the
cost of conducting business. These opportunities offer the
potential for the NIF to operate with a smaller amount of
working capital, as well as the chance for the NIF to
conduct their present business at a lower cost. These
opportunities would produce a secondary effect of reducing
the cash held outside the Treasury Department, thus contrib-
uting to the reduction of the Federal Government's cost of
money.
The opportunities for the Navy Industrial Fund to manage
cash and costs more effectively and efficiently are summa-
rized as follows:
1U2
1. Beorganization of the NIF activities under a single
command would improve cash management effectiveness
and efficiency.
2. Use of flexible stabilized rates would minimize NIF
yearly cash position fluctuations.
3. Consolidation of all NIF working capital into the
corpus and development of a model to determine the
optimum amount of working capital necessary to con-
duct NIF operations.
4. Development of procedures to reduce the amount of
unreconciled cash.
5. Sustained management effort to reduce MIF operating
costs, including reduction in direct material in-
ventory, optimization of the size of the lator
force, and reduction in overhead expenses.
6. Establishment of production standards without con-
sideration of their impact upon prices.
7. Development of a program of incentives, designed to
motivate managers throughout NIF towards actions
which would improve Loth the effectiveness and
and efficiency of NIF cash management.
8. Increased use of fixed price contracts in order to
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